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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On a clear day too warm to be the middle of December, a crowd of roughly 1,500 thronged to
the plaza in front of the south end of Tokyo Station and gazed up at the magnificent
"Renaissance Style" building rising before them. Equally impressive was the line-up of
officials and politicians on stage. Chief Engineer of the Railway Bureau Ishimaru Shigemi
read a report on the construction, followed by a ceremonial address from Railway Agency
President Sengoku Mitsugu. Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu then added a few words, as
someone who had supported railways from the beginning. finally, Tokyo Mayor Sakatani
Yoshio gave a congratulatory address, and the crowd celebrated the opening ofTokyo
Station, "The Gateway to the Imperial Capital," as fireworks exploded in the early winter
sky.1
The crowd was exuberant. It was December 18, 1914, and World War I had broken
out the previous summer. Japan stood poised to assert itself as a dominant world power, as
Europe was overcome by internecine warfare. It had jump~d at the opportunity to declare
war on Germany and to expand its power into China by occupying German possessions in
Shantung andi.n the Pacific. And now the general of the Shantung occupying force, Kamio
1 Harada Katsumasa, Nihon no Kokutetsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1(84). 59, and Tokyo
Minami Tetsud6 Kanrikyoku, ed T6ky6-Eh Eki-shi (Tokyo Tokyo Minami Tetsud6
Kanrikyoku, 1973),30-31,34; Teikc'ku Tetsud6 Taikan Hensan kyoku, ed. Teikoku Tetsud6
Taikan: Meiji Taisho Tetsud6 Hatiatsu-shi (Tokyo: Hara Shabo, 1984), plate number 24;
Tokyo Hyakunenshi HenshO Iinkai, ed. T6kyo Hyakunenshi 4 (Tokyo: Gy6sei, 1979), 738-
739.
2Mitsuomi, was returning to Tokyo to report to the Emperor. According to plan, Kamio
arrived on the first train into Tokyo Station at exactly 10:30 AM, as the climax of the opening
ceremony. Fireworks continued overhead as the crowd enthusiastically cheered the return of
their "triumphant general" (gaisen shogun), by waving flags and shouting "Banzai!" Gen.
Kamio made his way through the Japanese version ofthe Arc de Triomphe, the celebratof)
"Great Green Arch" (Dairokumon) and adjacent pair of "Green Pyramidal Towers" (Hosui
soryokuto) specially erected in the station-front plaza, and was paraded to the Imperial Palace
down the appropriately named ''Triumphal Return Boulevard" (Gaisen Doro). Such pomp
and circumstance was befitting of a country that saw itself as, and was intent on being
recognized as, a "first-class power" (itto koku)?
It was no coincidence that such a celebration of Japan's empire coincided with the
opening ceremony of Tokyo Station. The Japanese nation-state and its domestic hegemony
and international reputation were directly tied to the station, as it was the junction of two
parallel track~ of Japanese state-formation: railway netvlOrk construction and capital city
planning.
From its inception in 1872 with the first line between Tokyo and Yokohama, the
national railway network played a critical role in the domestic and international poiitical
aspirations of the new Meiji government. One on hand, connections between productive
areas, such as large cities or industrial regions, and nearby ports, served an obvious economic
purpose. Yet at the same time, in a domestic form of "railway imperialism," the Meiji
2 Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 59-61; Tokyo Minami Tetsudo, Toky6-Ekl Eki-shi, 31: The
most detailed description of the opening ceremony is Nakagawa Ichiro, Yamaguchi Fuminori
and Matsuyama Iwao, T6ky6-Eki Tanken (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1987), 96-103. Gaisen Doro
is now called Miyuki Dori. The literal translation of itt6 koku is "first-class country," but
used in this context, it refers to the group of top world powers.
3government sought to use the railways as a means of unifying the country and asserting its
legitimacy by centering the network on Tokyo.
When the Meiji government allowed the establishment of the Nippon Railway
Company in 1881, it initiated an important new stage of railway development. Until the
nationalization of the 17 top-performing railway companies in 1906-1907, Japanese railway
development was dominated by private enterprise. Yet the private companies in the Kant6
region inadvertently contributed to Meiji "railpolitik" by building their own lines centered on
Tokyo for business reasons, and by conforming to government-imposed regulations on the
expanding railway network.
In their definitive account of early Japanese railways, Harada Katsumasa and Aoki
Eiichi identify two general motives of early railway investing. One was to reform the
network of transportation for industrial products and raw materials, improving factory and
mine transportation networks. Harada and Aoki call this the "industrial capitalist standpoint,"
and, in the early years ofJapanese railways, it was widespread among the political-business
elite, including zaibatsu industrial conglomerates such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Fujita, and
Sumitomo.3 These conglomerates were major investors and stockholders in the early trunk
lines. As Stephen Ericson explains, "the private railways that succeeded in the Meiji period
almost invariably depended on extensive equity participation by big-city capitalists and the
3 Harada Katsumasa, and Aoki Eiichi, Nihon no Tetsud6: lOO-nen no Ayumi (Tokyo:
Sanseido, 1973) 57-58.
4nascent zaibatsu."4 While they did profit from the management of railways, the main purpose
of these companies was to facilitate domestic distribution of goods and increase exports.s
As railway developers began to realize there was more profit potential in passenger
fares than in industrial conveyance, however, new lines were built from the second motive of
railway investing, what Harada and Aoki call the "railway capitalist standpoint." These
developers pursued profits through railway management, and were seen most prominently in
later stages of railway development.6 Because these new lines targeted passenger revenue,
they were constructed through highly populated areas, to connect large cities to one other.
Despite divergent motivations in railway investing, developers from both standpoints
constructed lines that converged on Tokyo. For industrialists developing the productive
regions north and west of the city, the most efficient way to reach the port in Yokohama, and
international markets beyond, was by connecting to the government's line between Tokyo
and Yokohama. Additionally, although Tokyo was still regaining population lost as a result
of the loosening of the sankin kotai requirements in 1862 and its abolition in 1868, it was still
the largest city in eastern Japan.? Having recovered to a population nearing one million by
4 Stephen J. Ericson, The Sound (lIthe Whistle: Railroads and the State in Meiji Japan
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 51.
5 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 58; Eiichi Aoki, "Expansion of Railway Network,"
Japan Rail & Transport Review, June 1994, 35-36.
6 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 58.
? Before 1862, "alternate attendance" requirements placed on daimy6 by the Tokugawa
regime prescribed that they live in Edo six months out of the year. In 1862, the requirements
were relaxed to only 100 days every three years, initiating a sharp reduction in Edo
population as retainers and artisans who served the daimy6 moved out of the city, a
downward spiral that was exacerbated in 1868 when the practice was abolished. Henry
Smith points out that Edo lost half of its population of 1 million after 1862, with 300,000
residents leaving in 1868 alone. Tokyo did not surpass Edo's peak population until the
1890s. See Henry D. Smith, II, "The Edo-Tokyo Transition: In Search of Common Ground,"
in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, ed. Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji
5the main years of private railway speculation, the late 1880s, Tokyo provided industrialists
with a large market of consumption and railway capitalists with a large supply of potential
riders, resulting in the location of Tokyo at the center of the emerging Kanto region railway
network.8
Although the central government yielded construction of railways to private
companies, it utilized several measures to guide the development of the network in order to
achieve its railpolitik. First, the government, through the Railway Bureau, personally
constructed the lines for the new private companies. Second, the charters awarded to the
initial private companies contained clauses that guaranteed the right of the government to
purchase the companies after a designated period. Third, a succession oflegislative
initiatives, such as the 1887 Private Railway Ordinance, the 1892 Railway Construction Act,
and the 1900 Private Railway Law and Railway Operation Law, ensured that the privately
constructed lines would be compatible with the government lines. Together, the private lines
and government lines formed an integrated national network centered on Tokyo that
conveyed the authority of the central government to all corners of the Japanese archipelago.
Meanwhile, to craft Japan as a modern, civilized nation-state, Meiji leaders sought to
re-create Tokyo as Telto, or the grand "imperial capital" of a unified Japan. Following the
Meiji Restoration, Tokyo became a "showcase" for the government to not only proudly
display Japan's newfound modernity to foreigners and thus spur renegotiation of the unequal
treaties, but also to demonstrate to the people of Japan the authority of the central
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 349-350; Henry D. Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea:
An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought until 1945," Journal ofJapanese Studies 4, no. 1
(Winter, 1978), 53.
8 For the population of Tokyo during the late Edo and Meiji period, see the graph in Smith,
"The Edo-Tokyo Transition," 356-357.
6government.9 Beginning with the construction of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872, and
continuing into the 1880s with the Yoshikawa Plan and the Tokyo City Improvement
Ordinance, Tokyo was re-cast along lines similar to Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann's
Paris, to become a symbolic imperial capital on a par with the grand capitals of the West. 1O
Tokyo also showcased the domestic authority and legitimacy of the Meiji
Government, as it was the focus of, and the force behind, several methods of what James C.
Scott calls state projects of "legibility" and "simplification."l] Similarly, Jeffrey E. Hanes
has argued that in the Meiji period "centralization was achieved through standardization.,,12
As the capital of the new Meiji government, Tokyo became the center and the standard for
the rest of the nation. Tokyo was the focus of the national transportation and communication
networks; the Tokyo dialect became the standard language; and local Tokyo solar time was
made the standard measure of clock-time for the entire country.13 Along with expanding
9 Tokyo is often described as a "showcase" or "window." Although the term has since been
used by many scholars, Henry Smith is most often credited with first describing Tokyo as
"showcase" in English (Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea," 53).
10 Although Tokyo did not undergo the same level of creative destruction that took place in
Paris under Baron Haussmann, the Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance contained many of
the same urban planning elements - parks, sewers, railways, broad avenues - that were
implemented in Paris.
II James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), Ch. 1-2.
12 Hanes, "Contesting Centralization?", 488.
13 Shun'ichi J. Watanabe points out that railways and telegraphs connected Tokyo-to the
entire country, in "Tokyo: Forged by Market Forces and Not the Power of Planning," in
David L.A. Gordon, ed. Planning Twentieth Century Capital Cities (London: Routledge,
2006), 102. Nanette Twine argues that shortly after the Meiji Restoration, the Tokyo
language had "consolidated its position as Japan's lingua franca," (Nanette Twine,
"Standardizing Written Japanese: A Factor in Modernization," Monumenta Nzpponica 43:4
[Winter, 1988]: 439). The first standard time in Japan was set in reference to Tokyo solar
time in 1879, which remained the standard until Imperial Edict (chokurei) number 51 in 1886
set the country on Greenwich Mean time at 135 degrees east longitude (Nakamura Naofumi,
7bureaucratic control into the periphery, such efforts of centralization and standardization
allowed the central government to integrate its population and control its territory, a process
that David Nugent has called the "annihilation of regional space by state power. ,,14
Referring to the similar role of Paris in French modernization and state formation,
French historian Eugen Weber has described this centralized process of acculturation as akin
to domestic "colonization.,,15 Like Paris, Tokyo was the focus of state formation through
centralization. Aprodicio A. Laquian's description of the role of primary cities in colonialism
sheds light on Tokyo's role in Japanese state formation. As Laquian asserts: "Colonizers
based in the primate cities subdued the rest of the country and created a unity that was
imposed at first but later became the basis for stable government.,,16 As the "colonial
capital," Tokyo was the metropole based on which the Meiji leaders enacted domesti~
colonization to Integrate the pe:iphery, and form a united naticm. 17
Although it shares some common characteristics, this Meiji form of domestic
colonization should not be confused with the concept of "internal colonialism," which has
"Railway Systems and Time Consciousness in Modern Japan," Japan Review 14 [2002]: 20;
a digital image of the decree is available through the National Diet Library digital collection,
accessed on 7/13/2008 at:
http://www.jacar.go.jp/DAS/metallistPhoto?IS_STYLE=default&REFCO0 F=A0302000550
0).
14 David Nugent, "Building the State, Making the Nation: The Bases and Limits of State
Centralization in 'Modern' Peru," American Anthropologist, New Series, 96:2 (Jun., 1(94):
338.
15 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization ofRural France, 1870-1914
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 485-496, esp. 486; Scott, Seeing Like a State, 72.
J6 Aprodicio A. Laquian, The City in Nation-Bui:ding: Politics and Administration in
Metropolitan Manila (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1966), 17.
17 For integration of Japanese periphery into Tokyo, see, Karen Wigen, The Making ofa
Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
8also been occasionally called "domestic colonialism.,,18 The main similarity between Meiji
domestic colonization and internal colonialism is the uneven relationship between the center,
either the metropole or the primate city, and the periphery. In both, the center shapes and
assimilates the periphery to form the nation, yet the motivations of the center differ between
the two methods. Whereas in internal colonization the center exploits the periphery for
economic gain or for racial reasons, the purpose of Meiji domestic colonization was to
centralize the nation on the monumental capital of Tokyo to assert domestic hegemony and
international power.
As the colonial capital of a government uniting the country through domestic railway
imperialism, it was expected that the construction of a monumental central train station would
be predominant in plans for the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito. 19 Like Victoria Terminal in
18 Evolving from its Leninist inception of the forceful removal and relocation of citizens to
under-populated regions of the country, the concept of "internal colonialism" and its variants,
such as "internal colonization," "primate city parasitism," and "domestic colonialism," came
to describe the process in which the ruling elites of a country or the central government
exploit domestic ethnic groups for the benefit of the power holders. In such contexts, the
concept has been used to analyze the experiences ofNative Americans and African-
Americans inthe United States, as well as the Scots, Welsh and Irish in Great Britain. For an
informative discussion of the evolution of the concept of internal colonialism, as well as an
argument for its use by historians, see Robert 1. Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept,"
Comparative Studies in Society and History 26:3 (July, 1984): 543-568. The related concept
of primate city parasitism asserts that primate cities have a negative and degenerative effect
on the national periphery, as they drain resources and population from rural areas. See, Bruce
London, "Internal Colonialism in Thailand: Primate City Parasitism Reconsidered," Urban
Affairs Quarterly 14:4 (June, 1979): 485-513. Carter, et. al. use the term "domestic
colonialism" to describe the process otherwise called internal colonialism in the South
African context in, Carter, et. al. South Africa's Transkei: The Politics ofDomestic
Colonialism (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Michael Hechter pioneered
the use of"internal colonialism" to describe the assimilation and exploitation of domestic
ethnic groups in Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). For internal colonialism and Native
Americans, see lace Weaver, That the People Might Live: Native American Literatures and
Native American Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 10.
19 The planning for the central station was the first instance in Tokyo where city planning
incorporated layouts for rail lines. Previously, lines had been built outside of the city,
9Bombay, India, the planned central train station would project the power and authority of the
colonial builders, in this case the central government, to the people and the international
community.20 When finally opened as the "Gateway to the Imperial Capital" (Teito no
Genkan) in 1914, Tokyo Station had become the focal point of an imperial railway network
that united the nation, and spread via rail-ferry all the way from Tokyo to Seoul, Harbin, and
beyond to the grand capitals of Europe. Thus. with the completion of Tokyo Station atthe
center of the Teito and as the cornerstone ofthe national railway network, the Japanese
government asserted domestic hegemony and anticipated international recognition as a
modern "first class power" (itto koku).
purposefully avoiding built-up areas, as in the case of the Yamanote Line. These lines were
thus also outside the purview of city planners. Tokyo Station, along with its feeder lines,
however, fell completely within the city limits of Tokyo. One legacy of this development is
the elevated tracks that pass through the urban areas between Shinagawa and Deno to this
day.
20 For a discussion of Victoria Terminal as a symbol of British imperialism, see Steven
Parissien, Station to Station (London: Phaidon, 1997), 70.
10
CHAPTER II
MEIJI DOMESTIC RAILWAY IMPERIALISM
In March of 1854, American Commodore Mathew Perry returned to Tokyo Bay after the
initial visit of his "black ships" in 1853. On this second visit, Perry presented the officials of
the Tokugawa Shogunate with numerous gifts, among them a quarter-size model railway.
Although many of the Shogunal officials and Japanese people who watched the train circle
the track laid down by the Americans behind the reception hall at Yokohama were impressed,
the Japanese leaders did not immediately capitalize on the potential of railways.] At the time,
they remained satisfied with the existing system of nationwide distribution, which relied on
road traffic on the T6kaid6 and Nakasend6 highways and river and coastline barges to ship
rice from northern T6hoku and Hokuriku to Edo and Osaka, or fishmeal fertilizers from
Hokkaido to the Inland Sea region?
In the years between Perry's presentation of the miniature train in 1854 and the fall of
the Shogunate in 1868, many foreigners continued to advocate the construction of trunk lines
between ports and large cities for economical reasons. Most ofthese plans called for lines
between Edo and Yokohama, or Kobe and Osaka.3 In addition to their economic potential,
the Tokugawa government also began to recognize the ability of railways to assert state
1 Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 4.
2 Aoki Eiichi, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," Japan Railway & Transport Review I
(March, 1994): 28.
3 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 28.
11
authority. As the Satsuma and ChasM domains became increasingly anti-Tokugawa, the
Shogunate made plans in 1866 to construct a railway between Kyoto and Edo. A link
between the imperial capital of Kyoto and the political capital ofEdo, the Shogunate hoped,
would not only promote trade, but also consolidate Tokugawa power throughout the country.4
In addition to the link between Edo and Kyoto, the moribund Shogunate also
authorized a secretary in the American legation to build a railway between Edo and
Yokohama in 1867, but the Tokugawa government collapsed soon thereafter.5 The
Americans requested the renewal of the agreement with the new Meiji Government in 1869,
but it was rejected on the advice of the British Minister to Japan, Harry Smith Parkes,6 In
fact, Parkes himself had been encouraging the new Meiji Government to build railways in
order to modernize Japan, and on December 7, 1869, met with the Meiji leaders to discuss the
introduction of railways and telegraph into Japan. Among the leaders at the meeting were
Vice Minister of Finance Okuma Shigenobu and Assistant Vice Minister of Finance Ita
Hirobumi, both of whom subsequently became the leading advocates for railway building in
Japan.7
This meeting produced plans for several railways lines that were similar to the earlier
Shogunal plans. One line was planned between Japan's largest city at the time, Osaka, and
the nearby port of Kobe, with later extensions to Kyoto and Otsu. Another line was planned
4 Tanaka, Tokihiko, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways I," Contemporary
Japan 28:3 (1966): 567-568.
5 Tabu Tetsuda Shashi Henshushitsu. Tabu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi. Tokyo: Tabu Tetsuda
Kabushikigaisha, 1998, pg. 8.
6 Gordon Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes: British Representative in Japan, 1865-1883 (London:
Japan Library, 1996), 109; Tabu Tetsud6, T6bu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi, 9.
7 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 28.
12
between Tokyo and the port city of Yokohama, and another between Tokyo and Kyoto.8 As
these plans show, the Meiji government recognized the economic and political benefits of
railways. Like the Tokugawa before them, the Meiji leaders sought to use railways to assert
and legitimize their authority, and consolidate the country into a modern, unified nation.
Railways and State Formation in the European and Meiji Contexts
The contribution of railways to the political unification of nation-states has long been
acknowledged and discussed, especially in European history. Railways played a primary role
in national communication and transportation networks that were so important in integrating
distant regions into consolidated nations, as well as in developing national identities. In Italy,
the national railway network was given credit for uniting independent states into the nation of
Itaiy during the Risorgimento.9 As Eugen Weber has arg1jcd, in France, "There could be no
national unity before there was national circulation ...So roads, of stone or steel, welded the
several parts into one."IO Mathew Truesdell adds:
Moreover, these new link between Paris and the provinces seemed to many to be
uniting the country in a way that went beyond more rapid and efficient travel. France
seemed to becoming an integrated unit rather than a miscellaneous collection of
provinces. Railroad inaugurations took on a particular fascination because every new
line seemed to mark another step in these important transformations. I]
8 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 28; Tabu, T6bu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi, 7.
9 This argument was most prominent in the early decades after Italian uniticatlOn, btlt has
since been contested. See, Albert Schram, Railways and the Formation ofthe Italian Nation
State in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3.
10 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, 218.
II Mathew Truesdell, Spectacular Politics: Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and the Fete
Imperiale, 1849-1870 (Oxford: Oxford Universit) Press, 1997), 85-86.
13
Railways played a similar role in the integration of individual German states into a
united Germany, as Abigail Green has argued:
Railways linked hitherto distant towns, regions, and countries; facilitated the mobility
of goods, people and ideas; encouraged the development of regional, national, and
international markets; transformed popular perceptions of time and space. More
specifically, railways construction played a crucial role in what Hans-Ulrich Wehler
has termed the "dual revolution" - the twin processes of industrialization and national
unification that changed the face of Germany during the 185Os and 1860s. 12
Juan Batista Alberdi, an Argentine statesman, echoed this consolidating effect of
railways in the South American context when he argued that the railway:
...will unitY the Argentine republic better than any congress. A congress can
declare a country one and indivisible; but without the iron road, which draws together
a nation's far-flung extremes, the country will for ever remain divisible and divided in
spite of all legislative mandates. Thus political unity must begin with territorial unity,
and only the railroad can make a single area out of two places separated by 500
leagues. I3
Although the role of railways in European state-formation is widely
recognized, the Japanese case seems more applicable. 14 While state unification through
12 Abigail Green, Fatherlands: State-building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century
Germany (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001),223.
13 Quoted in Nicholas Faith, The World the Railways Made (New York: Carroll and Graff,
1990),65.
14 Yet there is no complementary literature on railways and Japanese state-formation. The
majority of scholarship on Japanese nation-state formation focuses on the emperor system,
education system and the Imperial Rescript on Education, the national army, or the
establishment of a standard language and the literary canon. See, for example: Gluck,
Japan's Modern Myths; Joshua A. Fogel, ed. The Teleology ofthe Modern Nation-State
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Tadao Umesao, Takashi Fujitani, and
Eisei Kurimoto, ed. Japanese Civilization in the Modern World 16: Nation-State and Empire
(Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000).
14
railways assumes that network construction was a project ofthe central government, in
European countries this was largely not the case. In fact, although heavily subsidized by the
central government, the railway networks in Great Britain, France, Italy, were constructed by
private companies who were interested primarily in profit. These networks were then later,
and in some cases much later, nationalized by the central governments. 15 Even in Germany,
railways were built by private companies and then later nationalized by Prussia in order to
unify the country. 16
In Japan, by contrast, railway construction was initiated by the central government
and then only later turned over to private enterprise. Enacting a domestic form of railway
imperialism, the Meiji government unilaterally undertook railway construction to assert and
legitimize their authority, and consolidate the country into a modern, unified nation.
Railways are often described as the first method of extending imperial influence into
foreign countries. I? The locomotive has even been called the "main engine of imperialism.,,18
As Ronald E. Robinson notes: "stee! rails had a capacity for transforming the societies
through which they ran and for spreading imperial influence in their domestic affairs ....,,19
15 Despite some earlier state-held lines, the majority of French railways were nationalized in
1937; German lines mostly in the years after Woild War I; alldBritish Rail created in 1948.
The only country to nationalize its railways around the same time as Japan was Italy, in 1905.
16 James M. Brophy, Capitalism, Politics, and Railroads in Prussia, 1830-1870 (Columbus:
Ohio State Cniversity Press, 1998), 19; Faith, The World the Railways Made, 62.
j7 Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, "'RaHpolitik': An Introduction," in T.G. Otte and Keith
Neilson, ed. Railways and InternaTional Politics: Paths ofEmpire, 1848-1945 (London:
Routledge, 2006), 7-9; Ronald E. Robinson, "Introduction: Railway Imperialism," in
Clarence B. Davis and Kenneth E. Wilburn, Jr., ed. Railway Imperialism (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1991),2-3; Faith, The World the Railways Made, 144.
18 Robinson, "Introduction," 3.
19 Robinson, "Introduction," 3.
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Utilizing this role of railways, imperialistic European powers, such as Great Britain, France,
and Germany, "began to play out their rivalries and project their imperial strategies along
railway tracks," giving rise to the concept of railway imperialism.20
For the Meiji leaders, the locomotive also functioned as an engine of state-formation,
as the state built railways around the country in order to centralize the nation and spread forth
Meiji influence. In this sense, the state-centric efforts of the Meiji government to use
railways to modernize the nation might be termed "domestic railway imperialism.,,2l
Because of their speed, and their ability to "dissolv[e] previous barriers of space and time,"
railways allowed spatial and temporal connections between the core and periphery that were
impossible before. 22 As Eric 1. Hobsbawm argued, the "agents" of the state, including postal
workers, teachers, police and railway engineers, "increasingly reach[ed] down to the
humblest inhabitant of the least of its villages.,,23 He adds, "revolutions in transport and
communication typified by railway and telegraph tightened and routinized the links between
central authority and its remotest outpostS.,,24 Thus, with the advent of a national railway
20 Neilson and Otte, "'Railpolitik: An Introduction," 7.
21 Ronald E. Robinson uses this term to describe similar state-centric efforts of using railways
to unify the country and establish the authority ofthe central government in Siam by King
Chulalongkorn. See, Ronald E. Robinson, "Conclusion: Railways and Informal Empire," in
Davis and Wilburn, ed. Railway Imperialism, 190. For analysis of King Chulalongkorn and
Siamese railway development, see David F. Holm, "Thailand's Railways and Informal
Imperialism," in Davis and Wilburn, ed. Railway Imperialism, 121-136.
22 Wolfegang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization ofSpace and Time
in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1896), 36-42, quoted in
Jeffrey E. Hanes, "Contesting Centralization? Space, Time, and Hegemony in Meiji Japan,"
in Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kern, eds., New Directions in the Study ofMeiji Japan
(Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997),491.
23 EJ. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 80.
24 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 81.
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network, even Japanese living in remote villages were only a short temporal distance from
the capital. No longer were they far removed, spatially and temporally, from central
authority.
Under strong state control, railways, along with the telegraph, provided the
infrastructure necessary to accompiish Meiji policies of economic and industrial
modernization (fukoku-ky6hei, shokusan-k6gy6), as well as political and ideological
unification (haihan-chiken, bunmei-kaika).25 Connecting large cities to ports, and linking
both to industrially productive regions, provided an economic and industrial basis for
government legitimacy. Meanwhile, connecting the new capital of Tokyo to the traditional
capital of Kyoto, and placing Tokyo at the center of the emerging national network, added a
political and ideological foundation for government hegemony, as railways reached into
periphery and spread government power and policies of modernization.
Yet the centering of Tokyo in the national railway network was not merely a result of
state-centric efforts. Private railway companies in the Kanto region also inadvertently
contributed to Meiji "railpolitik" of uniting the nation through railways centered on Tokyo.
Building on a theory developed with John Gallagher, Ronald E. Robinson has argued that
European imperialism during the nineteenth century was as much Euro-centric push as it was
"excentric" pull?6 In other words, the creation of "informal empire" was in some cases a
25 Baron Takaharu Mitsui points out that the modernization of Japanese traffic systems during
the Meiji period was from the beginning placed under strong state control, with a few
exceptions. See, Baron Takaharu Mitsui, "The System of Communications at the Time of the
Meiji Restoration," Monumenta Nipponica 4: 1 (Jan., 1941): 89.
26 Robinson and Gallagher first developed their alternative theory of European imperialism in
John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic
Historical Review 6:1 (1953): 1-15, and then refined it in Ronald E. Robinson and John
Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The OffiCial Mind ofImperialism (London: Macmillian,
1961). Robinson later further developed the theory in two articles: "Non-European
Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Roger Owen
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result of local elites actively soliciting the assistance of European imperialist countries in
modernizing their countries.27 A.pplying this theory to Meiji domestic railway imperialism,
the integration of the Japanese nation-state and centralization on Tokyo was not only state-
centric "push" but also excentric "pull." By building their lines centered on Tokyo for
business reasons and by conforming to government-imposed regulations on the expanding
railway net'vork, the private railway companies contributed to Meiji hegemony.
The Government Railways
In the early years ofthe Meiji period, the government faced an economic crisis that it
attempted to remedy with railways. Large amounts of Japanese capital were flowing out of
the country in exchange for foreign imports. Additionally, because Japan had relatively low
gold values, foreigners could cheaply exchange silver for gold and make a large profit. The
government sought to avert this situation through its "shokusan k6gy6" (increase production
and promote industry) policies, of which railway played a large role by facilitating domestic
distribution and transportation of exports goods.28 With this economic dilemma in mind,
railway lines had been planned between Japan's largest city at the time, Osaka, and the
nearby port of Kobe, with later extensions to Kyoto and Otsu. Another line was planned
29between Tokyo and the port city ofYokohama.
and Bob Sutcliffe, ed. Studies in the Theory ojlmperialism (London: Longman, 1927),117-
141; and, "The Excentric Idea ofImperiaIism, with or without Empire," in Wolfgang J.
Momrnsen and Jilrgen Osterhammel, ed. Imperialism and After: Continuities and
DiscontinuiTies (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986),267-289.
27 David F. Holm, "Thailand's Railways and Informal Imperialism," in Davis and Wilburn,
ed. Railway Imperialism, 121-136.
28 Harada, "Railroads, Ch. 2," 15-16; Tabu, Tabu Tetsuda Hyakunen Shi, 6.
29 A,)ki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 28; Tabu, Tabu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi, 7.
18
The government set about construction of the Tokyo to Yokohama line first, as it had
large economic and political implications. As Yokohama was one of the only international
ports open at the time, along with Nagasaki and Hakodate, western trade in the port was
increasingly rapidly. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposal explained that this growing
trade necessitated a rail link between Tokyo and Yokohama:
There are some who contend that the construction of a railway is not required, as we
are presently well accommodated with transport facilities over waters between Tokyo
and Yokohama. Nevertheless, trade at Yokohama has been growing steadily day after
day. Tokyo and Yokohama are located close to each other. So, it is essential to
obtain trade news [in Tokyo] promptly. The construction of a railway will join Tokyo
and Yokohama as if they were in the same district, and enable even women and
children to travel easily. Then trade will surely be further increased.3D
Yet along with the rapid increase of foreign imports entering the port of Yokohama,
the presence of foreign nationals was also becoming more noticeable. The small contingent
of one hundred permanent residents in Yokohama in 1861 for example, had grown to almost
1,000 by 1870.31 According to Michael R Auslin, there were 10,000 sailors visiting the port
for varying amounts of time throughout the year, meaning that at any given time, there could
be approximately 3,000 foreigners residing in Yokohama.32 Referring to the large number of
foreigners in both Tokyo and Yokohama at the time, Japanese urban historian Ishizuka
Hiromichi has classified these two cities as "semi-colonial.,,33 As Yokohama was the port of
30 Cited from Dai Nihon Gaiko Monjo Vol. 2, part 3, pg 76, in Tanaka, "Meiji Government
and the Introduction of Railways 2," 760-761.
31 Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of
Japanese Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 178.
32 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, 178.
33 Ishizuka, Nihon Kindai Toshiron, 23-31. Ishizuka was the first to make the claim about
Tokyo and Yokohama as "semi-colonial" from the large presence ofwestern soldiers in the
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entry for diplomats heading to the new capital for treaty revision, building a railway between
Yokohama and Tokyo also served the political purpose of demonstrating Japan's
modernization to both the domestic and international audience.
After acquiring a loan on the London market, the government set about building the
29-kilometer line in 1870 under the jurisdiction of the specially created Ministry of Public
Works (Kobusho), with actual construction being carried out by the Railway Bureau and
chief-director Inoue Masaru?4 Identical terminal stations, designed by obscure free-lance
architect R. P. Bridgens, were placed on each end of the line at Shiodome in Tokyo, and at
Noge Kaigan, in Yokohama.35 Both locations were chosen because they were close to the
urban areas of the cities and to the foreign settlements, thus facilitating trade, yet far enough
two cities. See, Ishizuka Hiromichi, Nihon Kindai Toshiron-Tokyo: 1868-1923 (Tokyo:
Tokyo Daigakku Shuppankai, 1991),23-31. Altering Ishizuka's term slightly, Paul Waley
points to the widespread adoption and implementation of western urban landscapes as a
process he calls "auto-colonisation [SiC]." See, Paul Waley, "Parks and Landmarks: Planning
the Eastern Capital along Western Lines," Journal 0/Historical Geography 31 (2005), 7.
James A. Fujii refers to the integration of the Tokyo periphery into the city-proper as
"colonization," rather than suburbanization. See, "Intimate Alienation: Japanese Urban Rail
and the Commodification of Urban Subjects," Differences: A Journal 0/Feminist Cultural
Studies 11:2 (1999),111-112,
34 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 28; Imperial Government Railways of Japan,
Railway Nationalization in Japan, 1; Katsumasa Harada, "Railroads" section of Chapter 2,
"Transportation in Transition (1868-1891)" in Technological Innovation and the
Development o/Transportation in Japan (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press,
1993),15,17. Inoue was a close friend of Ito Hirobumi, as both were from ChasM and had
been members ofthe so-called Choshu Five. The ChasM Five were a quintet ofChosht1
natives woo, defying the Shogunate's enjoinder against travel outside of the country, traveled
to England in 1863. While there, Inoue studied mining and civil engineering at University
College in London, making him one of the very few Japanese qualified in railway
construction upon his return to Japan in 1868. See, Inouye Masaru, "Japanese
Communications: Railroads," in Oklima Shigenobu, ed. Fifty Years o/New Japan, Reprint
(1910; repr., New York: Kraus, 1970), 425 (This Inou}"e~asaruisJhe same--<lsRailway . ._.
Bureau ChiefInoue Masaru. The difference in spelling is explained by changing conventions
for Romanizing Japanese names); Harada, "Railroads, Ch. 2," 19.
35 Julia Meech-Pekarkik, The World o/the Meiji Print: Impressions 0/a New Civilization
(New York: Weatherhill, 1986),87-88. .
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away from the city center to keep land prices cheaper.36 As a Ministry of Public Works
recommendation on the terminal locations suggests: "Unless the transport facilities were
established near the foreign concession and shopping center, it would not benefit trade
activities any ...Then it would become meaningless to build railways at all.,,37 The Ministry
ofMilitary Affairs also wanted the stations close to the foreign settlements so that the range
of movement for foreigners would be limited, preventing any bloodshed if Westerners
wandering too far into the city center came across any exclusionists.38
British engineers using British equipment completed construction of the single-track
line between the Yokohama terminus and Shinagawa Station, the southern "mouth" of
Tokyo, in May 1872.39 Passenger service started the next month between Yokohama and
Shinagawa, but was delayed to the Tokyo terminus at Shimbashi because the Army refused to
allow tracks to be built on its coastal training ground and its property near the Hama
Detached Palace (Hamarikyu). Instead, railway engineers had to construct a new
embankment on which to lay the tracks, finally completing construction in September.40 The
official opening ceremony was held in the presence ofthe Meiji Emperor on October 14,
36 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 28; Harada, "Railroads," 18.
37 Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 775.
38 Harada, "Railroads, Ch. 2," 18.
39 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 1. One legacy
of this British involvement in the development and construction of the network is that the line
gauge was set at 3 feet 6 inches, which was suggested by a British advisor because of Japan's
mountainous terrain and subsequently adopted as the standard gauge for all Japanese
railways. Hence the "Bullet Train" or Shmkansen ("New Trunk Line") has a gauge a whole
foot wider allowing a more stable and thus faster ride.
40 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 29; Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 28.
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1872, at the newly renamed Shimbashi Station, marking the commencement of both the
Japanese national and Tokyo railway networks.41
While this Tokyo-Yokohama line, called the Shimbashi Line, was the first railway
constructed, it was considered only a branch line of the main trunk network that would
traverse the Japanese archipelago and legitimize the new government. The construction of
such trunk lines was important, as chief of the Railway Bureau Inoue Masaru explained,
because the communication and transportation networks of Japan were inadequate for a
modern nation. The mountainous terrain of the Japanese islands forced nation-wide land
transportation networks to rely mainly on foot-power, making travel slow and difficult, and
hampering rapid long-distance communication along the Shogunate-administered roads.42 To
impede travel further,the Tokugawa required permits to travel, and barriers (sekisho) were
placed on major highway" to regulate and control inter-dGmainal transit for defense
purposes.43 The combination of~hese natural and artificial barriers encouraged feudalism and
regionalism. During the Tokugawa period the modern word for nation, kuni, for example,
had referred not to the "nation," but instead to individual domains, or han.44 Moreover, when
41 Ericson, The Sound o/the Whistle, 6; Tabu, T6bu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi, 18. Shiodome
Station had been renamed Shimbashi in June of 1872.
42 Inouye Masaru, "Japanese Communications: Railroads," 427-479; Mitsui, "The System of
Communications," 90. More recently, Constantine Nomikos Vaporishas argued that the
generalization of Tokugawa communications lagging as a result of a poor road network and
lack of bridges is completely false, See, Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, Breaking Barriers:
Travel and the Stote in Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ! 994),
11-12. What is important in the context, however, is that the Meiji leaders perceived that the
communications network was lacking, and therefore contributing to feudalism.
43 Inouye Masaru, "Japanese Communications: Railroads," 427-479; Vaporis, Breaking
Barriers, 133.
44 Alhert Craig, "The Central Government," in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, ed,
Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to }';feiji (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986),
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daimyo issued laws and spoke of the kokka (states or countries), they meant their individual
han, not the Japanese "nation-state" as a whole.45
While Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa Shogunate in
succession had perhaps centralized the country politically by pacifying individual daimyo, the
Meiji leaders perceived a threakning retention of feudalism and a weak national
consciousness on the part of the commoners. 46 The destruction of this persisting feudalism
and the formation of national consciousness were necessary to create a national government
and to politically integrate the nation. The Meiji leaders used a myriad of cultural tools to
"propagate this idea of a new national structure, and thereby to impress the people of its own
raison d'etre." 47 Modern communications, such as the railway and the telegraph contributed
38-39; Conrad Totman, "Ethnicity in the Meiji Restoration: An Interpretive Essay,"
Monumenta Nipponica 37:3 (Autumn, 1982): 274.
45 Hall, et al. "Introduction," 7. As Sakata and Hall caution, the term "feudalism" has been
used perhaps too "liberally" in Restoration history (Yoshio Sakata and John Whitney Hall,
"The Motivation of Political Leadership in the Meiji Period," The Journal ofAsian Studies
16:1 O'1ov. 1956): 33). Here, "feudalism" is used, as it was for early Meiji leaders such as
()kuma Shigenobu, to describe the fief-centric regionalism that pervaded Japan during the
Tckugawa and early Meiji periods.
46 John Whitney Hall, et aL "Introduction," in Hall, Nagahara Keiji, and Kozo Yamamura,
ed. Japan Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic Growth (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981), 7. Scholars have argued that early modern Japan was
mere politically integrated than earlier thought. See, for example, Hall, Nagahara Keiji, and
Kozo Yamamura, ed. Japan Before Tokugawa, and Philip C. Brown, Central Authority and
Local Autonomy in the Formation ofEarly Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1993). For Meiji leaders' perception of feudalism, see Inouye, "Japanese
Communications: Railroads," 427-479; Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of
Railways 2," 751-753.
47 Many scholars argue that Japan was already socially and politically integrated during, or
even before, the Tokugawa period. See, for example: John Whitney Hall, et aL, ed. Japan
Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500-1650 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981), and Mary Elizabeth Berry, "Was Early Modern Japan
Culturally Integrated?" Modern Asian Studies 31:3 (July, 1997): 547-581; for quote, see
Tanaka. "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 751.
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to national consciousness "by overcoming local isolation.,,48 Anthems, flags, and state rituals
were invented; newspapers and radio networks were developed; a school system was created;
state Shinto was crafted, all as a means to engender nationalism in the people. As Mary
Elizabeth Berry acknowledges: "The work of nationalism, and the creation of its essentially
new symbols, was the work of Meiji.,,49
Railways were especially useful tools in the endeavor to eliminate feudalism and
centralize the nation. While Carol Gluck writes that railways had emerged, along with the
monarch, as a "symbol of 'civilization,'" she adds that both were "associated with progress"
and contributed to the "national and social integration that characterized the modern state.,,50
Hara Takeshi builds on, and quotes Gluck's assertion, saying: "railroads and the monarch
together as symbols of 'civilization' and 'progress,' fulfilled their important role of spreading
forth from Tokyo to every corner of the Japanese archipelago to eliminate regional
differences, integrating national and social, characteristically of the modern state. ,,51
Illustrating the Meiji government's view, railway proponent Okuma Shigenobu argued in
1902:
To consolidate the hearts and minds of all the people, it is imperative to first demolish
such an inconvenient transportation and shipping system (unyu k6tsu). Furthermore,
some project to cause a great stir among the people is vital to demolish feudal
regionalist thought (h6kenteki kakkyo no shis6). Therefore, just as [I was] pondering
whether or not there was any effective means to do this, [I] heard about this railway
48 Kenneth B. Pyle, The New Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems ofCultural Identity,
1885-1895 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969),81.
49 Berry, "Was Early Modern Japan Culturally Integrated?," 555. See Gluck, Japan's
Modern Myths, and Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, on the invention of nationalism.
50 Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, 101.
51 Hara, "Minto" tai "Teito ", 22-23.
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debate. With such things as motivation, it was then decided that railways were the
overall best option, and from then on plans were made to initiate railways.52
The government's intention to use railways to consolidate Japan into one unified
country is elucidated in the Meiji Emperor's speech on the occasion of the opening ofthe
Shimbashi Line in 1872. "At this time, we announce the completion our country's initial
railway," the emperor read to the assembled crowd, " ... furthermore, we earnestly pray
(koinegau) that this enterprise [of railways] will expand, and this line will spread like a vine
(manpu) across the whole country.,,53
As trunk lines were put in across the country, perhaps the most important for
centralizing the nation and securing the domestic hegemony of the government was the line
connecting the traditional and cultural capital of Kyoto, and the new capital of Tokyo. As
Harada Katsumasa has observed, the construction of such an "iron-rail connection between
the old and new political centres [sic] would strengthen central authority.,,54 Strengthening
central authority required validating the moving of the seat of government in 1868,
accomplished by this rail link between the "two capitals."
Even before the fall ofthe Tokugawa Shogunate and the Meiji Restoration of 1868,
many future leaders, especially Okubo Toshimichi, felt that it was necessary to remove the
emperor from Kyoto after the change in government in order to limit the undue influence of
court aristocrats on imperial decisions. Okubo initially considered the port city of Osaka a
viable candidate and submitted a petition for the temporary transfer of the capital to Osaka in
52 Quoted in Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 8. Tanaka translates this quote more liberally in
"Me\ji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 752.
53 Hara, "Minto" tai ''T'eito ", 20.
54 Harada, "Railroads, Ch. 2," 16.
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February 1868.55 Others in the government preferred moving the capital to Edo, which had
several benefits: first, Edo was located strategically in the middle of the country where it
could keep watch on the pro-Tokugawa forces in the northeast; second, much of the former
Shogunate bureaucracy was still intact in Edo; and finally, Edo Castle could easily be
reinvented as the Imperial Palace.56
Still others favored the creation ofa dual-capital system. Edo would become the
"Eastern Capital," or Tokyo, while a second "Western Capital," or Saiky6, would be built in
the Kyoto-Osaka area. Those who supported this proposal, such as Oki Takata of Hizen
domain and Eta Shimpei, argued that maintaining the Western Capital was vital to prevent a
bifurcation of the country between East and West. Furthermore, it was imperative for the
emperor to travel frequently between the two seats of government to ensure solidarity. As
land travel between the two cities could take as long as two months, the construction of a
railway link was necessary to allow the emperor to spend equal time in each capital.57
In the end, an imperial decree entitled, "Decree Renaming Edo as Tokyo and Moving
the Capital," tentatively settled the issue when it was issued in September 1868.58 The decree
had proclaimed, "Edo is the great bastion of the east country. Upon it converge the crowds,
and from it one can personally oversee affairs of state. Accordingly the place known as Edo
55 Masakazu Iwata, Okubo Toshimichi: The Bismarck ofJapan (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1964), 117-118.
56 Iwata, Okubo Toshimichi, 118-119.
57 Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 1," 572-573; Ishizuka
Hiromichi, "Meiji-ki ni okeru Toshi-keikaku: Tokyo ni tsuite," in Tokyo-toritsu Daigaku
Toshi Kenkyukai-hen, ed. Toshi-k6z6 to Toshi-keikaku (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
1968),485.
58 Shibata Yunosuke, Meiji ShOchoku Zenshu (Tokyo: Kodokan Jimusho, 1907), Naichi 9.
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will henceforth be Tokyo.,,59 According to the decree, the name change from Edo to Tokyo
reflected that "all lands within the seas, east and west," were equally important to the
Emperor.6o Also, referring to the pro-Tokugawa forces in the northeastern regions of Japan,
the decree stated that the renaming was to "comfort and console the masses" (okuchO wo
suibu SU).61 The official explanation attached to the decree emphasized the need of "bringing
together the strength of the nation," and added that to this end, the emperor wished to make
"frequent progresses (junk6) between the East and West while listening to the multitudes.,,62
Although the dual-capital proposal was ultimately dismissed, many Meiji leaders
continued two refer to the cities as the "two capitals," and recognized the political importance
ofmaking it possible for the emperor to travel rapidly back and forth between the two cities.
According to a letter written by British Minister Parkes, who himself had advised the
government to build a line between Tokyo and Kyoto, influential Meiji leader Iwakura
Tomomi was an advocate for connecting the Eastern and Western Capitals by railway.63
Iwakura also reportedly told Parkes that the Japanese government understood the importance
of establishing closer contact between the two capitals, and that Kyoto could not be left to
deteriorate while the emperor lived in Tokyo.64 Coming from a court noble family, and
59 Translated in Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 26.
60 Donald Keene, Emperor a/Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912 (New York: Columbia
University Press), 159. .
61 Shibata Meiji Sh6choku ZenshU, Naichi 9.
62 Cited in Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 46.
63 According to another letter he wrote, Parkes advised the Meiji government to build a line
between the two capitals at a dinner party. See, Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes, 108. For Parkes'
letter, see Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 1," 581.
M Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 1," 581.
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having been opposed to the move of the capital from Kyoto to Tokyo, Iwakurasupported the
rail link as a way to retain Kyoto's importance and quell rising anti-foreign sentiment in the
city. In 1869, Iwakura urged the Gijo administrative and Sanyo advisory council members:
The very fact that the Eastern and Western Capitals are situated at a great distance
offers a cause for spreading ungrounded rumors and false reports. It is hoped that an
easy journey be made possible between those cities.65
The 1870 railway proposal submitted by the Ministries of Home Affairs and Finance to the
Supreme Council also emphasized the need of connecting the two capitals:
The Eastern and Western Capitals, forming, so to speak, the important body region of
this country, are the two bases, from which the government policies should be
administered. Once swift communications are established between these two cities so
as not to alienate the one from the other, there will be no fear of breeding such evils as
estrangement, or different customs and habits, between them.66
The connection between the two capitals was so important to the new government that
without this particular link, railways might not have been introduced to Japan at all. "Had the
introduction of railways been recommended on the ground of trade expansion, industrial
improvement, the advancement of knowledge or even the enlightenment of the people."
Tanaka Takahiko argues, "it would have been rejected by the conservative bureaucrats as a
matter requiring no immediate execution. As it was, the conservative bureaucrats recognized
its urgency in establishing better communications between the Eastern and Western
65 Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 773.
66 Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 754.
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Capitals ...That was, so to speak, the major commitment upon which the two groups,
progressive and conservative, could finally come to an agreement.,,67
To construct the trunk line between Tokyo and Kyoto, the government considered two
options, both following major Edo-Period trade routes linking the two cities. One was to
extend the Shimbashi Line and follow the T6kaid6 Road along the coast to Kyoto. The
second was to follow the mountainous Nakasend6 through the interior of the country. The
T6kaid6 and the Nakasend6 were the two most important ofthe Tokugawa Gokaid6, or Five
Highway system, likened to the "arms and legs of the realm.,,68 The system of nationalized
highways under the direct jurisdiction of the Shogunate, with evenly spaced post-stations
(shuku) and barriers (sekisho), had guaranteed Tokugawa control over land communications,
and also asserted the hegemony of the Shogun.69
Certainly, the Meiji decision to construct the new railway lines along either of the
Tokugawa highways was more than one of convenience. In fact, railways eventually
replaced all five of the Tokugawa Gokaid6 highways.70 While the routes would have been
well traveled and therefore potentially easier to construct rails on, undoubtedly the political
significance of laying railways on top of the Tokugawa highways was not lost on the new
central government. In the hands ofthe Meiji leaders, as railway lines spread the influence of
67 Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 774.
68 Vaporis, Breaking Barriers, 17.
69 Vaporis, Breaking Barriers, 29; Jilly Traganou, The T6kaid6 Road: Traveling and
representation in Edo and Meiji Japan (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004),14-15.
70 The T6kaid6 was replaced by the T6kaid6 Line, the K6shU Kaid6 was replaced by the
K6bu Line, the Nakasend6 replaced by the Takasaki Line, the OshU Kaid6 replaced by the
T6hoku Line, and the Nikk6 Kaid6, which largely following the Oshu Highway, was replaced
from the city of Utsunomiya by the Nikk6 Line.
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the central government into the most isolated and remote villages of the land, railway stations
replaced sekisho barriers as the symbolic points ofMeiji authority.
Planning of the trunk line between Tokyo and Kyoto began in 1870, two years before
the opening ofthe Shimbashi line. After an investigation of both routes by two Ministry of
Public Works officials, a recommendation was made for building the Tokyo-Kyoto trunk line
via the Nakasendo.71 As the officials explained in their report, "since there are many places
[along that route] where transportation is inconvenient, ifbranch roads are added here and
there, it will open the way to the conveyance of products and the civilization of mountainous
districts (yamaguni kaika)."n Indeed, the proposed line would have passed through the silk
producing regions of the southern part of K6zuke and northern part of Shinano, connecting
the silk, rice, and tea producing interior of the nation to the coasts.73 The government
ultimately decided to construct the line along the Nakasend6 because the Army, and Home
Minister General Yamagata Aritomo, strongly insisted that a coastal line would be in
increased danger of capture in case of foreign invasion.74
Even though plans were made for the building of the first leg of the Tokyo-Kyoto
trunk line from Tokyo to Takasaki in Gumma Prefecture northwest of Tokyo, they were not
immediately carried out because of several domestic problems that occupied the government.
71 Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 44; Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 34; Nihon
Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 1, Tokyo: Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6,
1971, pg. 145.
72 "Tokaido suji Tetsud6 junransho," 1870, Tetsud6-ryo jimubo, vol. 1, Japan Railway
Archives, Tokyo. Cited from quotation and translation in Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whzstle,
44. Also in Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 34.
73 Suzuki Jun, K6bushO to Sonno Jidai. Tokyo: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 2002.
74 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 34; Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 44; Ike
Nobutaka, "The Pattern of Railway Development in Japan," The Far Eastern Quarterly 4
(February, 1955),224.
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The new government was in the middle of carrying out land tax reforms, suppressing
disgruntled samurai revolts and the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement (Jiyu Minken
Undo), and calming calls for an invasion of Korea.75 In addition, the government had run out
of money after building trunk lines between Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, with the Kyoto-Otsu
line only being completed because of the strong advocacy of Railway Bureau chiefInoue
Masaru. Inoue was not as fortunate with the Tokyo-Takasaki line, however, and had to
cancel its construction.76
After the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, however, the military became increasingly
interested in a national railway network as a means of quickly moving troops across the
nation. At the Army's insistence, in 1883, the government authorized the building of a
segment of the Nakasend6 trunk line between Takasaki and Ogata using public bonds.
Taking the advice ofa foreign advisor, Richard Vicars Boyle, plans were made to begin
construction at both ends of the proposed Tokyo-Kyoto route. The line opened in segments
as construction was finished, the first in October 1885. But the steep grade ofthe route and
the number of valleys and peaks the line crossed raised concerns about the difficulty of
construction and its usefulness for transportation upon completion.77
Anticipating these concerns, Bureau ChiefInoue initiated plans for constructing a
trunk line following the T6kaid6 route. The results of this investigation found that the
distance between Tokyo and Nagoya (where the two proposed routes intersected) was shorter
along the less mountainous T6kaid6 route, and could be traveled more quickly. More
importantly for the cash-strapped government, the route would cost less to build. Using this
75 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudo, 35.
76 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudo, 30-31, 33.
77 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsudo, 35-36.
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evidence, Inoue convinced Prime Minister He. Hirobumi to support the T6kaid6 route, and Ito
in tum arranged for the government to change the route of the trunk line route on July 13,
1886.78 After the route change, construction proceeded relatively smoothly along the coastal
lowlands. When opened on July 1, 1899, the railway largely paralleled the historical T6kaid6
highway.79
When the T6kaid6 Line opened in 1899, it connected eastern and western Japan by
railway, as the historical T6kaid6 highway had done by road since the Heian period. Like the
Gokaid6 highways concentrated on Edo as the Shogun's capital, the railway lines of the MeiJi
government converged on the emperor's capital of Tokyo. Tokyo thus became the physical
and conceptual center of the national railway network. In discussing the connection between
railways and centralization, Hara Takeshi argues, "The development of railways centering on
the 'imperial capital' Tokyo starting in the Meiji Period engendered more than just the
economic dimension of the growth of Japanese capitalism, but was intimately linked to the
ideological dimension of forming national consciousness."so Tokyo became the reference
point for train direction, as "with Tokyo as the standard reference, all routes were
differentiated as either 'going towards Tokyo (Nobori)' or 'going away from Tokyo
(Kudari),' and the same laws and regulations were applied nationally."sI Starting in 1879,
local solar Tokyo time was set as the national standard, and the 1887 Railway Bureau
78 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 1, 156; Harada and Aoki,
Nihon no Tetsud6, 36.
79 Traganou, The Tokaido Road. 21. The T6kaid6 Line diverted from ~he highway bypassed a
few of the historical barriers and post-stations, such as Odawara, Hakone, and Mishima, and
also redirecting to pass through Nagoya (Traganou, The Tokaido Road, 21).
so Hara Takeshi, "Minto" Osaka tai "Teito" Tokyo: Shiso toshite Kansai Shitetsu. Tokyo:
K6dansha, 1998, pg. 15.
Sl II "~p " . "7" "28r ara, lVlmto taz 1 elto, .
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"Service Regulations for StatY Engaged in Operating Railways" declared that "The standard
time of each station shall be Tokyo time, and shall be transmitted to station by telegraph
every day ...."82 When opened in 1914, Tokyo Station, furthermore, became the "zero
kilometer" point from where rail distances were measured for all nationallines.83
Thiscentering of the national railway network on Tokyo was an important factor in
securing the domestic hegemony of the Meiji government. The government had initiated the
construction of trunk lines across the country, all the while locating Tokyo at the center. Yet
this centering of Tokyo was not only the result of state-centric efforts. When the government
stepped aside to allow private railway enterprise, the private railway companies in the Kanto
region built lines converging on Tokyo for their own business reasons. As private companies
proliferated, the central government took step'> to ens~re that their railpolitik was maintained.
In order to central ize the national nenvork on Tokyo, ,it was necessary that fi~st the lines in
tht> Kanto region converged on the city, as these lines were !at~r extended acr0SS the
archipelago. The central government was therefore directly involved in the pianning and
actual construction of rail lines for the private companies. The government then issued _
guidelines and regulations on railway construction to ensure that the expanding network
would remain compatible. By following the lead of the government and contributing to the
. .
centralization of the nation on Tokyo, the private railwaycompanies inadvertently
contributed to Meiji railpolitik. The Gompanies thereby facilitated Meiji domestic hegemony.
82 Nakamura, "Railway Systems and Time Consciousness in Modern Japan," 20,
83 Nakagawa, et. aI., T6ky6-Eki Tanken, 28, shows pictures of the "zero kilometer posts" for,
the various Iim~s within Tokyo Station. The historic marker for the Tokaido and Tohoku
Line~ is located between the second and third platforms of the station.
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The Private Lines
On May 21,1881, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Iwakura Tomomi submitted to the Governor
of Tokyo a petition signed by 460 other nobles requesting permission to found a private
railway company.84 According to Harada Katsumasa and Aoki Eiichi, "the movement for
founding private railway companies had just become realized.,,85 The company formed by
this petition, the Nippon Railway Company, was largely responsible for constructing the
Tokyo rail network as it was at the time of nationalization in 1906-1907. Of the other lines
built or acquired by the other companies founded during the years prior to nationalization, the
experience of Kobu Railways is most illustrative ofMeiji efforts to guide private railway
construction to fulfill its railpolitik.
There were two factors that guaranteed that the expanding private railway network
would converge on Tokyo. First, lines were placed so as to connect areas of high production
to areas of high consumption. Many of the early Kanto region lines were therefore built
linking the silk and textile-producing regions north of Tokyo to the city proper. Once a link
between these northern lines and the government line to Yokohama was completed in 1885,
export goods from these regions were able to reach trade vessels waiting in the port of
Yokohama. Second, the government actively encouraged and persuaded the companies to
construct lines to fulfill their plans of centering the network on Tokyo.
The person ultimately responsible for the creation of private railway companies was
statesman Iwakura Tomomi, an advocate ofprivate railway enterprise long before he
submitted his petition for the Nippon Railway Company to the governor of Tokyo in 1881.
As far back as 1874, only two years after the opening of the nation's first line, he had
84 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 30.
85 Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 30.
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supported the Tokyo Railway Association, founded by a group of former daimy6 and nobles
with plans to build a line between Tokyo and Aomori in the northern part of Honshu.86
Under pressure from the government, the association dropped its plans for building the
Aomori line and instead made a deal to acquire the government's Shimbashi Line in August
1876.87 Alth,:mgh the Shimbashi Line deal eventually fell apart when the company disbanded
in March 1878, the association's plans sparked heated debate in the government over whether
or not the state should maintain complete control over railway building or allow private
companies to manage lines. 88
Another group of former samurai founded the Tozan Company in May 1878 with
plans to build a line between Tokyo and Takasaki.89 However, the government refused the
plans ofthis company as well, presumably because the Railway Bureau itself was at that time
also considering building a line between Tokyo and Takasaki.90 Sparked by the cancellation
of these plans in November 1880, the Tozan Company again sought to officially start a
company and turned to Iwakura Tomomi for help.
lwakum's role as official in charge of peerage affairs for the Imperial Household
Department sheds light on his early support of private railways.91 In this role, he was
responsible for the former samurai and nobles who no longer received stipends as they had
86 Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 105.
87 Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 105-106.
88 Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 107.
89 Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 107.
90 Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 107-108.
9! Harada Katsv.masa, Technological Independence and Progress ofStandardization in The
Japanese Railways, Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1981, pg. 10.
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under the Tokugawa government. Instead. these "peers" were issued public bonds, which
quickly became worthless as inflation ran rampant after the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877.92 In
response, Iwakura arranged a loan from his 15th National Bank with the peers' bonds as
collateral, and submitted the aforementioned proposal to the Governor of Tokyo, creating the
Nippon Railway Company.93
The founding of the Nippon Railway was made possible by the financial difficulties
facing the government at this time. In addition to the outflow of money that followed the
importation of Western goods and technology, the government also triggered rapid inflation
as it issued enormous amounts of paper money during the Satsuma Rebellion.94 In order to
combat this inflation, Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi began a curtailment policy in
1880 and supported the foundation of private companies as a means of moving away from
costly government management and control ofindustry.95 As a result of Matsukata's
policies, many government enterprises were sold to the private sector, initiating a boom in
private investment, especially in railways. "By taking on the debts of some of the pioneering
entrepreneurs at the start of industrialization," Hiromi Masuda argues concerning
Matsukata's policies, "the government served to lay the foundation on which private
enterprise of the next stage could be built.',96
92 Ike "The Pattern of Railway Development." 222; Harada, Technological Independence, 10.
93 Harada, Technological Independence, 10; Tabu, T6bu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi, 23.
94 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 29.
95 Aoki, "The Dawn of Japanese Railroads," 29; Ericson, The Sound ofthe Whistle, 108-109;
Harada and Aoki, Nihon no Tetsud6, 30.
96 Hiromi Masuda, "Policy" section of Chapter 2, "Transportation in Transition (1868-1891)"
in Technological Innovation and the Development ofTransportation in Japan, Tokyo: The
United Nations University Press, 1993, 7.
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Despite the financial difficulties facing the government, some of the Meiji leaders,
and especially the military, had remained reluctant to allow private construction of railways.
Public Works Minister, and Army General, Yamagata Aritomo, for example, had blocked Ito
Hirobumi's proposal in 1881 for the selling of special railway stocks so that the government
could exit the railway business.97 Furthermore, abandoning the railway industry also seemed
to suggest that the government would give up its ambition of integrating and centralizing the
nation.
To ensure the continuance of the Meiji railpolitik, and temporarily placate the
objections of the Public Works Ministry and Army, the Nippon Railway Company was
allowed only under a special charter, ensuring that the government would still construct and
control all railways.98 In addition to laying the tracks, the central government arranged for
. .
local governments to purchase the necessary land.99 The central government then protected
the financial stability ofNippon Railways through partial payment of interest and even acted
as a proxy in construction and operation of the lines. lOO Nippon Railways itself was basically
only responsible for providing funds and purchasing materials, further ensuring that the
tracks, facilities, and rolling stock of the company would be compatible with those of the
govemmentlines. IOI
From the beginning, the founders ofNippon Railway had intended to build lines in
accordance with the government-envisioned national network. According to an early
97 Masuda, "Policy, Ch. 2," 13.
98 Masuda, "Policy, Ch. 2," 13.
99 Harada, Technological Independence, 10.
100 Masuda, "Policy, Ch. 2," 13.
101 Harada, Technological Independence, 10.
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proposal, the company planned to build the aborted government Tokyo-Takasaki line with a
branch splitting off midway towards the northeastern town of Aomori, a line connecting the
two capitals (Tokyo and Kyoto) extending from Takasaki via the Nakasend6, a line branching
off from the Nakasend6 towards Niigata on the Japan Sea coast, and a separate line in
KyQshfL 102 One important feature of these plans, excluding the line in KyQshU, is that the)
all radiated out from Tokyo.
The first line opened by the Nippon Railway Company was the Tokyo-Takasakiline
originally planned by the government. A deal was made with the government where the
actual construction would be done by the Railway Bureau, while Nippon Railway trained
crews in preparation for a planned second line. 103 C0nstructiqn started in September 1882,
but a dec,ision was yet to be made as to where the Tokyo terminus would be located. Ie.<: fhe
company had originally considered connecting the line to the government's Shimbashi Line
at Shinagawa. However, the northern end of the line was progressing well, and constructing
the connection from Kawaguchi to Shinagawa would have taken time because of the hilly
terrain on the western side of the city. The company, therefore, proposed instead to build
their Tokyo closer to the built-up area of the city. They located one potentIal site on a hill
overlooking the city in an area called Ueno, The terrain between Kawaguchi and Veno was
relatively flat, allowing for quick construction and earlier commencement of service.
The company saw this as an opportunity to begin making profits sooner than would
haw been poss;bl~ if the terminus had been located in Shinagawa, The Takasaki Line, as it
10: Nihcn Koku)u TetsuQ6, Nihon Kokuyu Te,sud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,417.
103 Nihan K0ku)'u Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,432.
104 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kckuyu Tetsud6 HyakunenShi 2,435.
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was called, opened completely in 1884.105 With the assistance of the military and the central
government, the Takasaki Line was later extended to connect Tokyo to the rice and oil fields
along the Japan Sea coast. When the line opened to the coastal city ofNaoetsu in 1893, it cut
the travel time to Tokyo from six days to less than twelve hours, creating trade markets for
Niigata rice, Hokkaido coal, and oi1. 106
The government, however, wanted a connection between the port of Yokohama and
the productive regions in the center of the country, which had yet to be linked by rail to the
coast. In fact, when the government restarted construction of its Tokyo-Kyoto line along the
Nakasendo highway in those regions, it planned to connect with the Nippon Railway line in
Takasaki. 107 The government could not construct the line itself due to its financial struggles,
but it could still exert pressure on Nippon Railway to do it for them. After finishing
construction of the Takasaki Line. the Nippon Railway Company had put its plans to build
the Kawaguchi-Shinagawa connection on hold, blaming a shortage of investment capital. 108
The company had also wanted to focus on its plan to build a new line out of Ueno. 109 In
response, Railway Bureau Chief Inoue rejected the planned line and wrote a letter to the head
ofNippon Railway, Yoshii Tomosane, urging that the Kawaguchi-Shinagawa line be built as
105 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2, 435.
106 Wigen, The Making ofa Japanese Periphery, 188-189; Aoki, "Expansion of Railway
Network," 34.
107 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 3.
108 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 1, 611.
109 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2, 438.
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quickly as possible. liD The stockholders of the company learned their lesson, and in a special
meeting, voted to begin construction. 11 i
Construction was again carried out by the Railway Bureau and started in January
1884. The line opened March 1, 1885 as the Shinagawa Line, later to be called the Yamanote
Line, and connected to the Takasaki Line north of the city.]]2 Because the line was originaliy
intended to serve as a freight connection between the silk-producing regions of Gumma and
the port of Yokohama, it intentionally circumvented the built up areas of the city to the
west. 113 In this way, trains could run unimpeded all the way from Maebashi to Yokohama to
unload their silk goods onto the waiting foreign transport vessels. Silk cargo had traditionally
been shipped by barge down the Tone River and then on to Yokohama, but the new rail link
made the travel shorter, cheaper, and safer than river and coastal shipping,; 14 Shortly, all
export goods from Gunma to Yokohama were shipped along this line. 115 Such transport
made the Yamanote Line one of Nippon Railways' most successful, and provided the
company a dramatic increase in revenue. I 16
1ID Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 1, 611.
I I I Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2, 438.
t 12 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,433,438.
113 Tir)', "Tokyo Yamanote Line," 5: Ericson, The Sound o/the Whistle, 45.
; 14 Katsumasa Harada, "Policy" section of Chapter 3. "Transportation in the Period of
Railroad Priority (1892-1909)" in Technological Innovation and the Development of
Transportation in Japan, Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1993, pg. 46.
'15 Harada, "Policy, Ch. 3," 46.
116 Masuda, "Policy, Ch. 2," 14. The origir.al industrial and transport purpose of the line also
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Once the Shinagawa Line was complete, Nippon Railway set about fulfilling its
intention of building a line to Aomori. In its original charter application, it had stated that the
Aomori line would branch off somewhere in the middle of the Takasaki Line, but two years
later in 1883, that junction had still not been determined. In May of that year, Nippon
Railway requested a Railway Bureau survey to identify the best route for the first branch of
the Aomori line to Dtsunomiya in Tochigi Prefecture, northeast of Tokyo.II7 Students from
the Public Works College carried out the survey and in November of 1884, Railway Bureau
Chieflnoue submitted a report to the company weighing the merits of locating the junction at
either Kumagaya or Omiya, and ultimately suggesting Omiya.118 The Omiya-Dtsunomiya
branch of the so-called Tohoku (Northeast) Line was completed and opened for service in
1885.119 When opened completely in 1891, the line stretched all the way from Tokyo to the
far northeastern city of Aomori, spreading central authority to the realm of the Tokugawa's
last supporters.
With all of its originally planned lines completed, Nippon Railway turned back to the
additional line out of Deno that Railway Bureau ChiefInoue had rejected in 1883. The plan
was for this line to head northeast out of Deno to the Joban coalfields ofIbaraki and
Fukushima Prefectures in northern HonshU. In order to facilitate conveyance, the line
connected to the Takasaki Line, and was opened in 1896. 120 Linking the town of Mito and
117 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen 8hi 2, 439.
118 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen 8hi 2, 439.
119 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Hyakunen 8hi 2, 433.
120 Takeo Arisue and Eiichi Aoki, "The Development of Railway Network in the Tokyo
Region from the Viewpoint of the Metropolitan Growth," in The Association of Japanese
Geographers, ed. Japanese Cities: A Geographical Approach, Tokyo: The Association of
Japanese Geographers, 1970, pg. 192; Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo
Hyakunen 8hashin-shi, 110.
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the coal producing areas around Iwanuma to the Nippon Railway's terminal in Deno, this
Mito Line was used mainly to convey coal to Tokyo, earning Nippon Railways substantial
profits. 121
The majority of the Tokyo railway network was operated by Nippon Railways before
it was nationalized in 1906. As a company primarily focused on industrial conveyance for
profits, the company had built its lines to facilitate such transportation. As railway
speculation began to increase, and the number of railway companies in the Tokyo area grew,
the trunk lines of Nippon Railways served as a frame for the Tokyo network. Because the
Yamanote Line was the most efficient route to the port of Yokohama, it played an
increasingly important role in the city network. Subsequent railway companies sought to
connect their lines to the existing Nippon Railway lines in order to reduce construction costs
and provide faster shipping to YokQhama through the Yamanote Line.
Seeing :he profits made by Nippon Railway after the Yamanote Line opened in 1885,
macy private entrepreneurs and investors sought to build their own railways.122 In tact, as
many as fifteen charters had been awarded for new railway.companies by 1891.123 Three
companies, in particular, sought to emulate Nippon Railway's success: the Ryomo Railway
Company, the Mito Railway Company, and Kobu Railway Company. Both the Ryomo and
Mito Railway companies simultaneously built lines branching off ofNippon Railway's trunk
121 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nih(ln Kokuyu Tetsudo Hyakunen Shashin-shi, 110; JRR, JR
Zensen Zeneki (Tokyo: Kosai Shuppansha, 1997), 178; Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon
Kokuyu Tetsudo Hyakunen Shashin-shi, 110. A cutoff was later added between Nippori and
Mikawashima in 1905 giving the line its present route (1RR, JR Zensen Zeneki, 178).
122 Masuda, "Policy, Ch. 2," 14.
123 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 2.
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lines :n order to t:xploit the productive regions north of Tokyo, while K6bu Railway
concentrated on the regions to the west ofthe city.
Because these private companies subsequently built lines that connected to existing
NippClIl Railway lines, all three were founded as "branch lines" ofNippon Railway.
Moreover, President Narawara Shigeru of Nippon Railway served concurrently as president
of Mito and Ryom6 Railways in 1890-1891, and had been elected president of Kohu Railway
in May 1888.124 Because of its close relationship with the Railway Bureau, Nippon Railways
acted almost as an agent ofthe government. Just as the government attempted to maintain
control over Nippon Railways with strict regulations and a close relationship, the government
was now using Nippon Railways as its agent to engender the same c<?ntrol over the newer
companies. Ryomo and Mito Railways ev~ntually merged with Nippon Railways because of
tinar.ciai diffIculties, while the more financially stable Kobu Railways managed_tQseCllrtc its
complete independence from Nippon Railway in 1891.125
Kobu Railways was more financially stable than the Mito and Ry6mo companies
largely because it focused on the less developed productive regions to the west of Tokyo.
The city ofHachioji directly west of Tokyo, for example, had long been an important
transportation center on the Koshl1 Kaido, one of the Tokugawa's important Gokaid6
highways centering. on Tokyo.126 This location made Hachi~ji a natural distribution center
for agricultural products and silk and textile goods. Beginning in the early Meiji Period,
investors began seeking nevz modes oftransportation for these products and especiaily for the
124 Eric.son, The Sound a/the Whistle, 150; Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kakuyu Tetsud6
Hyakunen Shi 2,506.
125 Ericson, The Sound afthe Whistle, 150.
126 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,503. The Five Roads
(Gokaid6) were the Tokaid6, Nakasendc" Nikko Kaido, Kos~l1 Kaid6, and the Oshl1 Kaid6.
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limestone being mined in more distant parts ofthe Tama region of western Tokyo
Prefecture. 127 Yet these plans were mired down on several occasions due to changing
technology, economic competition, and finally by government indecision concerning the
private operation of railways.
As early as 1883, plans were presented to the government to build a horse-powered
railway west from Shinjuku.128 At this time, Nippon Railway's Shinagawa Line had not yet
been built through Shinjuku, but it was still an important location on the western outskirts of
the city as it was the branching point of the Koshu and Orne Roads. After the government
rejected this plan, other investors, including former Kanagawa Prefecture Governor Iseki
Moritome and Tokyo industrial capitalist Amenomiya Keijiro, proposed their own route,
intending to concentrate on limestone mining in the Orne Region. 129 They were joined by
investors from the western Tama region, who convinced them to first build a line between
Tokyo and Hachioji. 130
The investors decided on a terminal point at Shinjuku and applied for permission to
found the Kobu Horse-powered Railway Company in April 1884. 131 Yet by the time that
permission was granted to found the company in November 1886, steam-powered railways
127 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,503.
128 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,503.
129 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,503; Ericson, The Sound
o/the Whistle, 141.
130 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,503.
\31 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2,504.
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were replacing horse-powered railways as the preferred means of operation, and the company
applied for permission to build change to a steam railway.J32
The founding of the company would be delayed again by competition from the
Musashi Railway Company, which proposed building a line similar to that proposed by Kobu
Railway between Hachioji and Kawasaki in Kanagawa Prefecture. Although this plan was
supported by the governor of Kanagawa, as it was the shortest distance between silk dnd
textile products in Hachioji and the port in Yokohama, the proposed connection would
undermine Meiji railpolitik. Rather than converging on Tokyo, a direct line between
Hachioji and Yokohama would run well to the south of the city.
The importance of retaining Tokyo at the center of the national network was not lost
on Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo. As an army general, Yamagata hadrecognized the
strategil.: implications of railways and earlier reccmmended tha;t the Tokyo-Kyoto line be
built inland to prevent damage from foreign attacks. He had also blocked Ito Hirobumi's
proposal that the government should exit the railway business in 1881. Still Home Minister
five years later, Yamagata now had the opportunity to ensure that the national rail network
would focus on Tokyo, as he would choose which company would be given permission to
build a line from Hachioji to Yokohama. In line with Meiji railpolitik, Aritomo thought it
more i,?portant to directly connect the populatiol). centers of Tokyo and Hachioji. In
addition, the connection of the Ene to Shinjuku would contribute to the importance ofthe
Yamanote Line, as Shinjuku Station was located on the line. Hence, he recammended
approval of the Kobu Railway application and guaranteed that Tokyo would remain the
center of the national network. 133
132 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 2, 504.
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Although the Kabu Railway was given permission from the government for
construction, a new obstacle presented itselfwhen the government passed the Private
Railway Ordinance in May 1887. Under the new ordinance, the company's original
authorization as a horse-powered railway would be considered temporary. Narawara
Shigeru, acting as the representative for the Kabu investors, then sent a letter to Prime
Minister Ita Hirobumi requesting the allowance ofthe Kabu Railway Company as a branch
line ofNippon Railway. The government authorized the founding of the company.in March
1888, The investors, in turn, elected Narawara president ofK6bu Railway Company.134
A petition for the government to construct the line was subsequently signed jointly by
Narawara, as president ofNippon Railway, and Sashida ShigejOr6, founding committee
member ofK6bu Railway. 135 As a branch of Nippon Railways, the construction of Kabu
Railways' lines would be completed by the Railway Bureau, and the bureau would also be
responsible for subsequent maintenance. 136 Because of protests from citizens in the cities of
Ch6fu and FuchO, who were concerned that the railways would reduce business in the area.
the line was planned in a straight line from Shinjuku to Tachikawa instead of following the
more circuitous KashO road. 137 Construction was started in 1888, and the whole line to
Hachi6ji opened later that same year. 138
134 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsuda, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Hyakunen Shi 2, 506.
135 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsuda, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Hyakunen Shi 2, 507.
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Kabu Railway's concentration on Shinjuku illustrates the profit-oriented motivations
of its investors as well as the Meiji government's railpolitik. As the Kabu line was built for
the purpose of transporting limestone and silk products, a connection to the Yamanote Line
allowed the most cost-effective and efficient conveyance to Yokohama. Meanwhile, the
insistence of the government. in the person of Home Minister Yamagata, for the Kabu line to
detour to the Yamanote line at Shinjuku rather than heading directly to Vokohama reveals the
government's determination to construct a national railway network focused on Tokyo.
Regulation of the Private Railway Network and the Success of Meiji Railpolitik
As the private railway companies increased in number and the private railway network grew,
the central government took extra steps to ensure that their railpolitik would Dot be
ccmpromised. Aside from being involved in route selection and constrw;:tion of the private
company lines, the government secured the right to nationalize private railway companies in
the future. The government also issued a ~eries of regulations to ensure that each line in the
private railway network would be compatible with the government's own lines. This
compatibility facilitated the nationalization of the railways in 1906-1907, by which the Meiji
government reclaimed control over the national netwerk and asserted domestic hegemony.
The regulations placed on Nippon Railway upon its founding in 1881 eluddate the
Meiji government's efforts to continue its railpolitik even after it had a\lowed.the formation
of private railway companies. As part of the special charter awarded.Nippon Railway, the
government ensured "strict and comprehensive control" over all phases of railway business,
"including construction, accounts, and rate-making.,,139 The term of concession for the line
and right-of-way was fixed at 99 years, and the government reserved the right to repurchase
139 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 2.
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the line after 50 years. 140 The agreement also stipulated that work on the lines should be
started no later than six months after the granting of the charter, with all lines completed
'h' 7 141WIt III . years.
The military, in particular, urged increased regulation of the private Jines. The army
had been pleased with the speed of troop movements during the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877,
and in I879 conducted a detailed survey of the transport capacity of the rai lway network,142 .
The military initially pressed for the railways to be upgraded to the international si:andard
gauge for all railways. This would allow expedited troop movements, as trains would be able
to travel faster on the wider tracks. Once this suggestion was deemed too expensive, the
military increasingly pushed for nationalizing and unifying railways to improve military
transport. 143
To appease the army's demands tor troop movement, the Nippon Railway charter also
included an article stating: "In the event of an emergency or war, the cc'mpany shall have the
obligation to allow the government, if so ordered, freely to use its railways.,,144 The army's
control over private railways was extended in 1884 by Cabinet directive. "Since construction
or alteration of railways has bearing on miiitary affairs,'~ read the new directive, "consultation
should be maj~ with the Ministry of War to discuss how it is to be executed." 145
14G Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 2.
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The railway boom following the opening of the Yamanote Line in 1885 heightened
the demand for standardization. The opening of the line and the profits Nippon Railway
made shipping silk had led to a dramatic increase in the amount of private railway
speculation. In 1889, tracks of the private lines stretched 840 kilometers, slightly less than
the 881 kilometers of the government lines. By the next year, however, private lines
surpassed the government's, extending to 1,357 kilometers. Until the nationalization in 1906,
"private railways rather constituted the mainstay of rail transport in Japan.,,146
This rapid speculation and increase of private railways around the country was
problematic for several reasons. First, it contradicted government efforts to standardize the
national railways, as the private companies imported technology from different sources. 147
KyOshO Railways, for example, imported materials and engineers from Germany, while
Hokkaido coal lines used American materials. Even the government began importing
I!1aterials increasingly from Germany and the United States, instead of Great Britain.148
Secondly, many lines that companies proposed were not realized, and investors lost large
amounts of money in the process.149 Finally, the private railway companies, ultimately
interested in profit, tended to build lines only in populous regions and where construction
costs would be relatively low. Entire regions of the country were left without rail access,
further impeding the formation of a national network and the social and political integration
of the state.150
146 Harada, Technological Independence, 11.
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As early at 1887, the Meiji government took steps to ensure that future lines would be
built to the same technical standards as the state railways, and even passed regulations to
guarantee that Tokyo would be the center ofthe private railway network. These new efforts
at regulation were championed by Railway Bureau ChiefInoue Masaru. Following the
abolition of the Public Works Ministry in 1885 and the placing ofthe Railway Bureau under
direct cabinet control, Inoue saw a rise in his influence over government railway policy.
With this newfound power, Inoue stepped in to combat rampant railway speculation and the
problems it caused by making an effort to consolidate government control over railways.151
With strong support from the military, special regulations were issued in the Private
Railway Ordinance in May 1887 codifying the concessions made to companies "as a first step
towards securing uniformity of operation under State controI.,,152 As Stephen Ericson
observes, althollgh the law was disguised as helping private railways gain legal recognition,
"the regulations were actually meant to control more than to assist railway companies.,,153
While this ordinance helped private railway companies in acquiring land, it also reduced the
amount of financial aid given by the government and lowered the government repurchase
option term to only 25 years. 154 The regulations also allowed the government to closely
observe construction and operation, and even order companies to make connections between
lines. 15s
151 Harada, "Policy, Ch. 3," 47.
152 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railtyay Nationalization in Japan, 3.
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Most importantly for maintaining Meiji railpolitik, the 1887 Private Railway
Ordinance located Tokyo at the conceptual center of even the private railway network.
Included in the ordinance was the "Service Regulations for Staff Engaged in Operating
Railways," made up of 463 articles. Article 21 delineated the method for setting the standard
time for all private railways:
The standard time of each station shall be Tokyo time, and shall be transmitted to
stations by telegraph every day according to the method that has been separately
established to ensure the correct time. 1S6
With this article within the Private Railway Ordinance, the central government forced new
private railway companies, and existing ones such as Nippon Railway, to submit to its
temporal authority by adopting Tokyo time. "In sum, the state railway attempted to
encourage the spread of this standard time among private railways by taking over the
operation system, improving the time consciousness of staff, and reorganizing the system ..."
Nakamura Naofumi argues, "Through such efforts, the Railway Bureau sought to achieve
unified control over the temporal as well as other dimensions of the nationwide system of
traffic."157
When the country faced recession in 1890, many private railways closed or merged
with more stable companies. Because of the troubles facing the private railways, calls for
nationalization gained strength. I58 Seeing an opportunity to push the nationalization issue,
Railway Bureau ChiefInoue presented his "Matters Concerning Railway Policy" to the
156 Nakamura, "Railway Systems and Time Consciousness in Modern Japan," 20.
157 Nakamura, "Railway Systems and Time Consciousness in Modern Japan," 21.
158 Harada, "Policy, Ch. 3," 47.
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cabinet in July 1891.159 This proposal discussed the purchase of private railway and
suggested that the government construct railways without concern for profit and IOSS.160
Inoue also recommend a law on railway ~onstruction and another for purchasing private
'61railways.! .
After studying the report, the cabinet submitted two bills to the Imperial Diet, which
had been estabiished the previous year in 1890. As Inoue had recommended, one bill called
for selling national bonds to fund the purchase ofprivate railways, while the other bill was to
allow the purchase of the lines. 162 The private sector learned of these bills and, sensing the
threat it presented to their industry, submitted an opposing bill to the Diet through
sympathetic Diet members. 163 The private railways convincingly argued that they could
construct and operate railways more cheaply and efficiently than could the government and
the bills were rejected by the Diet in 1891.164
Not to be dissuaded, the government reintroduced the same two bills the next year. 165
After being greatly amended, the bills were put to a vote. Diet member~ had begun to realize
the benefits of rail lines passing through their electoral districts, and were more supportive
this time around. The bill for buying the private railways was rejected again, but the loan bill
159 Imashiro, "Nationalisation of Railroads," 42; Masuda, "Policy, Ch. 2," 14. Masuda calls
this memorandum the "Proposal on Railway Policy."
J60 Masuda, "Policy, Ch. 2," 14.
:61 Harada, "Policy, Ch. 3," 47.
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52
passed both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers and b~came the Railway
Construction Law on June 21, 1892.166
Although the bill allowing the purchase of the private lines had been rejected, the new
Railway Construction Law continued Meiji railpolitik, as it contained a clause that allowed
the government the right to purchase p:-ivate lines judged necessary !O complete the projected
trunk network centered on Tokyo.16? The new act also gave the government the ability 10
determine where new private trunk lines would be constructed, and which lines would be
built tlrst. This right extended government control over private lines, in essence making all
of the private Ene companies proxies for the government. The government's control was
tetal: it set standards in line construction, such as line gauge, curve radiI, and platform height,
and permitted the building ofpnvate r~ilways only if the government wan~ed them built. 168 ,
The new regulations set forth in the Railway Construction Law came right in time.
because the stock scare of i 890 did not last long. The economic prosperity following the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 led to the "second railway boom" of 1895-1898.169 The
new regulations ensured that even companies founded in this second railway boom would
conform to government railway standards, facilitating future nationalization. Yet the
economic prosperity, which led to the creation of new railway companies, also drove away
cails for private railway nationalization. In this way, ,the ebb ,and flGW of nationalization
sentiment com~spondeddirectly to the strength or weakness of the economy.
i66 Imperial Gove:-nment Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalizatiofl in Japan, 3; Harada,
"Policy, Ch. 3," 47.
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When the second rail boom turned to bust as another recession hit in 1898-1899, calls
for nationalization returned. This recession saw the dissolution of no fewer than 15
companies because of lack of funds. Mergers and absorption of competitors was common,
and the number of private railway had reduced from 66 in 1897 to 39 by 1906.170 As
expected, sentiment for nationalization again rose during the economic downturn. In 1899,
the issue came before the Lower House ofparliament, leading to a proposition for
nationalization. An enquiry committee appointed by the government to investigate the topic
recommended nationalization, and two bills for nationalization and state purchase were again
put before the Diet in 1900. Again, both bills failed to pass. 171 The government reacted by
issuing more strict laws regarding private railway operation in the Private Railway Law and
the Railway Operation Law, both of 1900.172 The two laws together replaced the outdated
1887 Private Railway Ordinance, and regulated private railways serving as trunk lines. 173 As
a result, the authority of the Railway Minister was greatly enhanced over both the·
government and the private railways. The minister could even control passenger and cargo
fares. 174
Sentiment for nationalization once again grew during the Russo-Japanese War of
1904-1905. As a government report stated, two important factors in railway nationalization
were "the national spirit of expansion engendered by the successful war with Russia, and the
170 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 4-5.
171 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 5.
172 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 5.
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need of the times for the speedy development of national industry.,,175 Indeed, by the time of
the Russo-Japanese, the Japanese economy had turned towards heavy industry, causing an
increase in domestic freight volumes. With this shift, even staunch capitalists began to favor
nationalization, as it would strengthen distribution networks. Prominent businessman
Shibusawa Eiichi, for example, had been heavily involved in private railways beginning with
the Nippon Railway Company, and had argued against the calls for nationalization whenever
there was an economic downturn. 176 Yet he became a promoter of nationalization because
improved distribution promised to help his business interests.
One of the most ardent supporters of nationalization after the Russo-Japanese War
was the military. According to the military, the national railways had proved inadequate
during the Russo-Japanese War. Minster of War Terauchi Masatake summarized the position
of the military in a session of the Diet on March 3, 1906:
National defense is defensive and offensive, and systematically related railways are
necessary not only to passive, but aiso to active protection. As concerns the first case,
we have had a most unfortunate experience with the private roads; and in the other
contingency, in which the cooperation of maritime interests is needed, the private
roads have again proved themselves insufficient. It was further shown in the war with
Russia that the operation of the private railways, constructed with poor materials, was
absolutely deficient. l77
Despite War Minister Terauchi'sclaims that the private lines had been inadequate
during the war, Japanese railways were able to convey 1.3 million passengers, and 3.2 million
175 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 6.
176 Aoki, et. al. A History ofJapanese Railways, 39-40.
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tons of freight. 178 Although on the surface encouraging nationalization for the reason that the
private lines were inadequate, the military had again recognized the pivotal role railways
played in military campaigns. The army further realized that success in any future wars on
the continent would require an even more efficient rail network. For this reason, the military
was strongly in favor of consolidating the domestic, Manchuria, and Korean raiiways into
one transportation system. 179
The government responded with a plan for incorporating the railways into one
network. This policy had three aims: to smooth domestic transport, lower freight and
passenger fares, and standardize and integrate the railways. Such changes, the government
hoped, would reduce costs and liabilities, while increasing operation convenience. A second
reason for nationalization was that it would prevent the railways from being taken over by
foreign investors. The government had feared that foreigners would be able to purchase a
controlling interest in the companies. Nationalization would prevent this from happening. I80
The government presented the Railway Nationalization Law to the Diet in March
1906. This law passed the Lower House unchanged, but received opposition in the Upper
House. A committee was appointed to review the law, and as a result the number of
companies to be purchased was reduced from 32 to 17. 181 After being amended, the law was
forced through at the end of the Diet session after all opposing lawmakers had walked out. I82
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The law was passed on March 31, and became the Railway Nationalization Law. 183 This law
stipulated that the government would buy the 17 appointed private railways within 10 years,
with all of the companies being nationalized before the end of 1907. 184 The law also
authorized the purchase of the Keifu Railway Company in Korea. 185
The purchased railways were chosen with the intent of finalizing the national trunk
network centered on Tokyo. Companies that provided service primarily to a single region
were therefore omitted. Of the seventeen lines nationaiized, four were in the Tokyo region.
Nippon Railway and Kobu Railways were purchased in 1906, while Sobu Railway and the
Boso Railway, which converged on Tokyo from Chiba Prefecture to the east, were purchased
the following year. 186 As a result of the nationalization, government-owned lines, which had
previously only accounted for 30% of the national total, increased to almost 90% of national
trackage. I8? The government's portion of control would have been even higher had it been
able to nationalize all 32 companies that it sought.
Nevertheless, tracks owned solely by the government after the nationalization
stretched from nnrthern HonshU all the way to KyushU, and were located on all four of the
main islands of the archipelago. 188 Moreover, the !\1eiji government had successfully
fostered a network that fulfilled its railpolitik. Tokyo was located at the physical and
conceptual center of a railway network that spread central authority to all ccrners of nation, to
183 Imashiro, "Nationalisation of Railroads," 43.
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even the humblest villager. With the purchase of Keifu Railways in Korea, government lines
also extended beyond Japan-proper to its territory in Korea, marking the beginning Japan's
imperial railway network. By nationalizing the network and even beginning its own
European style "railway imperialism" in Korea, the Meiji government took a big step towards
cementing their domestic hegemony and gaining international recognition Both would be
accomplished with the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito, and the construction of the monumental
Tokyo Station
58
CHAPTER III
FROM TOKYO TO TEITO
On February 26, 1872, just four years after the Meiji Restoration, a great fire broke out in the
Ginza district of Tokyo. Raging over 95 hectares ofland in the center of the city, the fire
destroyed roughly 3,000 buildings and displaced some 50,000 people. 1 From the fire
"emerged the new Ginza," as Edward Seidensticker described the government's response to
the damage? Rather than allow the area to be rebuilt in a more traditional manner, Meiji
leaders Okuma Shigenobu and Inoue Kaoru seized the opportunity to rebuild the area in a
showcase of bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment), as "an impressive and fire-
resistance district suitable for the imperial capital.,,3 The burnt area had provided the Meiji
leaders with a blank canvas on which to paint the model of a modern national capital that
would unite the nation and project the authority of the new central government to both the
domestic and international audiences.4
I Andre Sorensen, The Making ofUrban Japan: Cities andplanningfrom Edo to the twenty-
first century (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 61.
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During the age of imperialism, national capitals proliferated as one ofthe "logical
outcome[s] ofthe nation-state."s Internationally, these monumental capital cities were the
"physical representations of the power and wealth of the nation-states then competing with
each other.,,6 As Takashi Fujitani observes, "in that age of rising nation-states a sort of
international rivalry in the display of national power and prestige through urban architecture
and space swept through Paris, Madrid, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and
Washington.,,7 In France, for example, when Paris "had to have a physical magnificence
worthy of its importance," Baron Haussmann created a capital that would rival imperial
Rome "and celebrate a new form of Empire."g Yet for a Meiji government that tied its
domestic legitimacy and international reputation to modernity and teleological progress, the
national capital, often used to "express a vision of an idealized future," became a space that
showcased the modernization and Westernization of Japan.9 As such, Tokyo became the
symbol of the united, modernizing state and "an official sign of Japan's progless and
prosperity. ,,10
5 Anthony D. King, "Cultural Hegemony and Capital Cities," in John Taylor, et aI., ed.
Capital Cities: International Perspectives (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 253.
According to King, the other natural outcomes are nationally organized apparatuses of
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The most visually stunning and effective way for Japan to showcase its modernity and
progress was through the use of Western architecture in the capital. The construction of
Western-style buildings in the grand Western-style capital of Tokyo represented Japan's
participation "in a worldwide competition to be enlightened and civilized," as "in the age of
imperialism, capital cities were regarded as symbols of the progress of mankind and as the
embodiment of modern civilization."!! As William Coaldrake argues, "Architecture was
charged with a mission of the highest national significance: proclaiming loudly on every city
block and street corner Japan's assurance and authority as a modern state.,,]2
Tokyo thus had two roles as national capital during the Meiji period, both of which
contributed to the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito, or the "imperial capital." On the domestic
stage, Tokyo was the focus and force of state formation and integration through centralization
and standardization. In this role. the capital had become the metropole of Meiji domestic
colonization. The government then used modernity and progress to ideologically integrate
the people of Japan, and placed Tokyo at the conceptual nexus. Henry Smith has argued that
Tokyo was a "showcase" of modernity, "on the one hand a sort of two-dimensional back-
drop against which the latest fashions and inventions from the West were displayed, and on
the other a proving-ground for institutional innovations."] 3 Similarly, Shun'ichi 1. Watanabe
Toward a Historical Ethnography of the Nation-State," in Cultural Nationalism in East Asia:
Representation and Identity, Harumi Befu, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993), 98.
\] Evelyn Schulz, "The Past in Tokyo's Future: Kada Rohan's Thoughts on Urban Reform
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Edo and Tokyo (London: Routledge, 2003), 286
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points out that "as a capital city at the centre ofJapan's efforts to modernize and Westernize,
Tokyo represented the country's most important site for exchange with foreign countries.,,14
Domestically, Western architecture displayed the authority of the central government
and became the symbol ofnew Meiji government authority.ls Western buildings embodied
the "authority of a central gov~rnmellt that aimed to rnle fare more directly than did the
previous Tokugawa government.,,16 As Toshio Watanabe argues, "Large, imposing modem
edifices would impress upon the Japanese people the power and stability of the new
regnne.,,17 Watanabe continues, articulating the symbolic value of Western architecture.for
the domEstic audience:
Western styles were clearly different fropl anything Edo culture could offer and.
above all, provided an image' of modernity. The public could see for itself that the
new government was progressive rather than retrogressive like the old one. By using
Western styles the governmental patrons of such buildings could make then political
intentions visible. Additionally, Western-style buildings looked grand and impo.~ing,
a rare quality in Edo-period architecture. Multistory stone or brick buildings gave the
impression of solidity, permanence, and authority, all qualities the young Meiji
government was striving for. The Western style fit the bill perfectly.18
In its international role, Tokyo was the monumental capital city that would project a
"modern and civilized aspect to the outside word in order to persuade the Western powers
-------------
14 Watanabe, "Tokyo," 101.
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that Japan was a country to be treated with respect.,,19 One of the major challenges iacing the
Meiji leaders when they gained control of the country in 1868 had been projecting this
modern and civilized image to the outside world in order to revise the so-called "un-equal
treaties." This treaty revjsion process began when over half of the Meiji ruling elite,
including lwakura Tomomi, Kido Koin, Ito Hirobumi, and Okubo Toshimichi, visited the
United States and Europe from] 871 to 1873.
Although the official purpose of this Iwakura Mission was to secure treaty revision
and study western political and administrative institutions, the Meiji leaders also learned first-
hand how far behind Japan was in terms of architecture and city planning.2° As Andre
Sorensen argues, the mission "served to persuade its members of the inadequacy of Japanese
dties.,,'!1 The Japanese leaders had visited Paris, recently renovated by Napoleon III and
Baron Haussmanr., and a5 it did for people ::!round the world, Paris thereafter became the
urban model of modernity fer the Japanese leaders.22 Ultimately, the mission c()]ivinced the
Meiji leaders of the need for Japan's own monumental capital on a par with the great capitals
of Europe. In order to construct their modern capital, the Meiji government implemented
western architecture and city planning to show that Japan was a modern nation "worthy of
being treated as a equal among other developed nations.,,23
19 Sorensen, 7',l-le Making Qf Urban .lapan, 45.
20 WilHam P. Ker, "Treaty Revision in Japan: A Survey of the Steps by Which the AboHtion
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The immediate domestic and international goals of creating Teito were, then, to assert
the hegemony of the central government, prevent the encroach111ent of the Western powers,
and renegotiate the unequal treaties. All the while, the ultimate goal in the mind of the Meiji
leaders as Tokyo became Teito was to garner international recognition and acceptance as a
modern nation?4 Although not a constant process, this re-creation of the capital started with
the construction of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872, and grew stronger in the 1880s with the
competing "Project for Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya" and "Yoshikawa Plan,"
as the Meiji leaders saw the need for and the potential to create a capital to impress the
international community. Finally, with the opening of Tokyo Station in 1914, Japan was able
to anticipate acceptance as a first-class world power (itt6 koku).
The "Door to Bunmei"
Immediately after the great fire in Ginza, the government announced plans to rebuild the area.
The speed, and the scale, with which the Meiji leaders, led by Okuma and Inoue, seized the
chance to rebuild the district from the ground up indicates the importance of the project's
political ramifications. Plans for the construction of nearly 1,000 buildings were announced
only six days after the fire. 25 At the hands of the Meiji government, the new Ginza rose from
the smoldering ashes of the traditional Low City as the first step in transforming Tokyo into a
beacon of modernity that would project the authority of the central government to both the
international and the domestic audience.
The physical location ofGinza perfectly suited the goal of showcasing Japan's
civilization and enlightenment to the Westerners who had come to the country for treaty
24 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 208-209.
25 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 62.
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revision Henry Smith argues that Ginza's location indicates that the Brick Quarter was
intended to impress these foreIgn observers.26 The area was bordered by Marunouchi to the
west, the foreign settlement at Tsukiji to the east, and the new Shimbashi railway station to
the south. Therefore, any foreign visitor or dignitary making his way from Yokohama via
railway would walk directly through Ginza on his way to renegotiate treaties at the ministry
buildings, or to his hotel in the Tsukiji foreign settlement??
The Ginza Bricktown also had domestic implications. Gavin Shatkin has suggested
that the first political function of capital cities is to "present an 'argument' for the legitimacy
of [the national government's] policies and programmes [sic] by presenting the capital as a
symbol of progress that represents a template for the rest of the nation to follow.,,28 In this
vein, the Meiji leaders hoped that the Western-style Brick Quarter would. act as a modei of
modernity and bunmei kaika for the rest ofthe city, and the nation beyond. Indeed, as
Fujimori Terunobu writes, for the Japanese government. "the door to bunmei was in Girza.',29
Urban historian Ishizuka Hiromichi has also suggested that the construction of the Ginza
Bricktown, as the first step of re-creating Tokyo as Teito, was a means of political
consolidation. As Ishizuka argues:
The new government, at the time the sole external representative of Japan, was in the
process of also becoming the sole domestic unified ruler (toitsu-teki shukensha). As
such, the first undertaking in the prQject of establishing a Teito suitable for a centrally
26 Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea," 54.
27 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 61.
28 Shatkin, "Colonial Capital," 579.
29 Fujimori Terunobu, Meiji no Tokyo Keikuku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982),3.
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ruled, unified nation (chuo shuken-teki toitsu kokka) was the construction of the Ginza
Bricktown.3D
Although only about a third of the planned 1,000 buildings were completed because
of financial shortfalls, the Bricktown became the herald of civilization and enlightenment for
all who saw it.3! One contemporary Japanese observer declared of the Ginza Bricktown,
"Here one feels as if one were in a foreign country for a while.,,32 Hattori Bush<), author of
the New Tales ofTokyo Prosperity (Tokyo Shin Hanjoki) published between 1874-1876,
points to the Ky6bashi Brick District, of which Ginza was the main part, as one of the
symbols of civilization and enlightenment in the city. "To lift the darkness and spread
knowledge," Hattori writes, "there is nothing like showing the actual scene with the real
things.,,33 To ensure that the district would be an effective model of progress by "showing
the real things," the Meiji leaders had hired English engineer Thomas Waters to design the
building plans in a suitably modern and "civilized" style. The resulting district was
thoroughly Western, at least on the street front - buildings off the main streets remained
Japanese. The Western buildings were all made of red brick, giving the district its popular
moniker, the Ginza Bricktown (Ginza Rengagai).34 Roads had been widened and had Japan's
first sidewalks, which had been planned even before the fire because of the large number of
3U Ishizuka, "Meiji-ki ni okeru Toshi-keikaku," 486.
31 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 62.
32 Meech-Pekarkik, The World ofthe Meiji Print, 92.
33 Quoted in Maeda Ai, Text and the City: Essays on Japanese Modernity (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2004), 80-81; Smith, "Tokyo as an Idea," 54.
34 The name is also translated as Ginza Bricktown. Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 59;
Sorensen, The Making ofUrban Japan, 62.
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foreign pedestrians in Ginza.35 The first gaslights in Tokyo were installed, and planted trees
lined the brick-paved streets.
Yet the Ginza Bricktown was not successful as a model from which modernization
would spread across the city and the nation. Although nearly 1,000 Western-style buildings
were constructed in Kyobashi Ward, which included Ginza, there were tewer than twenty in
the rest of the city. One ward, Yotsuya Ward, even had no Western buildings at al1.36 The
reason that the buildings did not proliferate could be that while interesting for visitors to look
at, they were not a very pleasant place in which to live. As Seidensticker explains: "They
were found to be damp, stuffy, vulnerable to mildew, and otherwise ill adapted to the
Japanese climate, and the solid walls ran wholly against the Japanese notion of a place to live
in. ,,37
While the Ginza Bricktown did not compel the visitors who strolled through the
Ginza -- a custom called Ginbura, or as Seidensticker translates in, "Killing time in the
Ginza,,38 - to rebuild their own homes in brick, it did contribute to the wave of popular
interest in Western architecture. From the 1870s. knowledge of "authentic Western
architecture" began entering Japan in the form of foreign books, returning students and
officials, and best-selling books on the West,39 The government also began hiring western
architects as foreign advisors (oyatoi gaikokujin) to train Japanese engineers. In 1870, the
Meiji government had also established the Public Works Ministry (K6bushO) in order to build
35 Suzuki and Yamaguchi, Shin Kenchikugaku, 251.
36 Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 59.
37 Seidensticker, Low City. High City, 61.
38 Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 61.
39 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 17.
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the raihvays, and also to train new Japane5e engineers at the Engineering College
(Kabudaigakka).40
The Ginza Bricktown was also successful in establishing brick as the preferred
material for Western-style construction, itself becoming a symbol of bunmei kaika.41 Soon.
brick buildings constructed in Western-styles began appearing all over Japan, including
museums, banks, and banquet halls like the Rokumeikan. Along with the imperial family
residences, the public half of the Emperor's palace, where he would appear as a modern ruler,
was even rebuilt in 1888 in the Western-style.42
Tracks to Teito
Afte" the completion of the Ginza Bricktown in 1877, there was a several year hiatus before
the next large project in the re-ereation of Tokyo as Teito This delay could have been a
result of uncertainty on the part vf government leaders concerning the role of Tokyo While
committed to moving the administrative center of the nation to Tokyo, some Meiji leaders
insisted that the symbolic capital should remain in Kyoto. Arguabl) furthest from their mind
was the re-creation of Tokyo as Telto. As Takashi Fujitani contends: "The idea of fashioning
Tokyo into the imperial city (teito) par excellence - that is, into the nation's symbolic and
ritual center -- did not become significant until the early 1880s. Few if any of the ruling elites
had such visions for Tokyo in the years 5hortly after the overthrow of the ancien regime in
1868.,,43
40 Suzuki Jun, X6"bush6 to Sonno Jidai, 3-4: Finn, .\leUi Reviszted, 17.
41 Yoshida Nobuyo, Nihon Renga Kika (Tokyo: Nichib6 Shuppansha, 20(0).
42 Suzuki and Yamaguchi, Shin Kenchiku'gaku Taikei, 230: Finn, Mezji Revisited, 93-94.
43 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy. 38.
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Certainly there were pressing domestic matters such as rampant inflation and the
Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 that preoccupied the government and prevented large-scale urban
projects. Yet another reason for the delay in re-creating Tokyo as Teito could be that until the
1880s the Meiji government was more concerned with using the capital to assert domestic
hegemony and display Japan's modernity than to pursue international power. In other words,
until the 1880s, the intended audience for the reconstruction of Tokyo was domestic rather
than international. The Ginza Bricktown, for example, had displayed Japan's modernity in
order to impress the foreigners inside the country for treaty revision, and to remind citizens of
the regime change. Beginning in the 1880s, however, the government's view towards Tokyo
began to change as the Meij i leaders saw the need and potential for creating a monumental
capital targeting an international audience.
Indicative of the government's changing view of Tokyo was the treatment of the
imperial palace. In 1868 the government had ordered the construction ofa new palace on the
site of the former Shogun's castle, but no action was taken on the order. Then in May 1873,
the emperor's residence was destroyed by fire, forcing the imperial family to live in a so-
called "Detached Palace" (Rikyu), which was actually an old daimyo estate. As Takashi
Fujitani observes, "they remained there, in the structure newly renamed the Akasaka
Temporary Palace for nearly sixteen years. In the meantime the heart ofthe city lay
empty ....,,44
Construction on a new palace did not begin until 1884. Repairs had been postponed
by imperial order two weeks after the fire in 1873, and then again in 1877 ostensibly because
of technical and financial difficulties. Fujitani speculates that there was another reason for
the delays: "Rather, the extremely long delay in even beginning the building project,
44 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 40-41.
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followed by a rush to build an extravagant palace and surrounding area can only be explained
by a radical change in the governing elites' perception of the palace.,,45 This change in
perception, Fujitani argues, was towards recognizing the imperial palace more than simply
the residence ofthe emperor, but as a representation of imperial authority and national
honor.46 Yet more than just a .::hange in the perception of the palace, the Meiji government
also experienced a change in how they viewed the capital city of Tokyo.
From the early 1880s, the government increasingly saw Tokyo more as a symbolic
national capital than just the political center of the nation. While not yet envisioning an
imperial capital, or Teito, on a par with the great capitals of the West, the government began
attempting to re-create Tokyo in the model of the Western capitals, particularly Paris, This
endeavor was initiated with the city's first venture into large-scale city planning" the 1880
"Tokyo Central District Demarcation Issues" (Tokyo Chuo Shiku Kakutei no Mondai'.
Presented by Tokyo Governor Matsuda Michiyuki, the plan had been mitiated in 1876 in the
Urban Improvement Committee established by then-governor of Tokyo Kusumoto
Masataka.47
Sitting on this Urban Improvement Committee were two prominent Tokyo
businessmen, Taguchi Ukichi and Shibusawa Eiichi. Taguchi was one of th~ most influential
of the early advocates of modernization; he had even been an investor in the Ryom6 Railway
Company north of Tokyo that ultimately merged into the Nippon Railway Company.
Taguchi was also the founder of the Tokyo Journal ofEconomics (Tokyo Keizai Zasshi) a~ld a
leader in the buY/mei kaika movement with his influential treatise Short History of
45 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 67-68.
46 Fujitani, ::-'plendid Monarchy, 68.
47 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 64.
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Enlightenment in Japan (Nihon Kaika ShOshi).48 Taguchi was also interested in city
planning, and in 1880 published his famous Theses on Tokyo (Tokyoron), calling for the
development of an international port that would make Tokyo a great world port.49
The 1880 report submitted by Governor Matsuda proposed concentrating
redevelopment efforts to create a high-density central business district. Modeled on Paris, the
proposal included plans for public buildings, roads, canals, bridges, gas and water lines, a
port for Tokyo, and fire prevention measures. Calling for great boulevards as in Paris, the
report advanced what has been called the "Paris-ization of Tokyo" (Tokyo no Pari-ka).50 Yet
the similarities with Haussmann's city did not go much further. The Tokyo plan emphasized
the concentration of economic activity and port development, while disregarding
Haussmann's creation of grand infrastructure.51 While Haussmann had been the architect
behind Napoleon Ill's imperial capital of Paris, these early city proposals for Tokyo
displayed what Andre Sorensen calls a "revealing lack of concern for the symbolic project of
creating a great imperial capital.,,52 Nonetheless, although it was never implemented, the
Matsuda Plan indicates that city planners had begun to look towards the grand European
capitals as a model for a national capital city, the first step towards creating Teito.
It was not until the mid-1880s that the project of creating a symbolic imperial capital
became a priority. From this time, the government and especially the Foreign Ministry,
48 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 64.
49 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 64.
50 Evelyn Shulz, "The Past in Tokyo's Future," 286.
51 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 64-65.
52 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 65.
71
whose task it was to renegotiate the unequal treaties, began to see Tokyo as Teito. 53 Two
competing city plans, the "Project for Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya"
championed by the Foreign Ministry and Minister Inoue Kaoru, and the Home Ministry's so-
called "Yoshikawa Plan," delineate this increasingly symbolic view of the national capitaL
Both proposals shared common characteristics that made the conversion from Tokyo to Teito
possible. Both looked to the great capitals of the West, especially Paris, as models for city ,
improvement, and most importantly both included plans for a central railway station.
The first plan to re-create Tokyo into a grand imperial capital was championed by
Inoue Kaoru.AsEoreign Minister, itwasJnoue'srespDnsibility to negotiate for the revision
of the treaties with the Western countries. Originally xenophobic, as were many Meiji
leaders, Inoue had come to recognize the need to Westernize in order for Japan to be accepted
as a modern nation, and was a leading proponent of the Ginza Bricktowl1. ~4 [n 1883, Inoue
spearheaded the construction ofthe Rokumeikan, a Western-style ceremonial holl cJmplete
with ballroom that became a symbol of Japanese attempts to Westernize.55 Inoue was
preparing for a treaty renegotiation conference scheduled for May 1886, intended to be the
final such conference, and therefore encouraged the creation of a grand Western-style capital,
complemented by a National Diet, prisons, and various ministry buildings. ';6
53 Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa, "Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan and Its Urban
Development," in the Center for Urban Studies, ed. Tokyo: Urban Growth and Planning,
1868-1988 (Tokyo: Center for Urban Studies, 1988), 11.
54 Watanabe, "Josiah Conder's Rokumeikan," 25; Ishida Yorifusa, Nihon Kindai
Toshikeikaku no Hyakunen (Tokyo: Jijitai KenkyQsha, 1987),46.
55 Ishida Yorifusa, ed. Mikan no Tokyo Keikaku: Jitsugen Shinakatta Keikaku no Keikakushi
(Tokyo: Chikuma ShabO, 1992), 11; Suzuki and Yamaguchi, Shin Kenchikugaku Taikei, 231.
56 Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 11; Ker, "Treaty Revision in Japan," 2.
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In February of the same year, Inoue assembled the Temporary Construction Bureau
(Rinji Kenchiku-kyoku) under direct cabinet control, with himself as the chairman, and was
steadily proceeding with preparations for construction. The only thing left was to find an
architect who could actualize his ideas.57 Inoue initially turned to Josiah Conder, a British
architect who taught at the Engineering College and then at Tokyo University- and had
designed Inoue's Rokumeikan, but ultimately rejected the design Conder produced.58 Inoue
then looked to Europe, and hired two German architects, Wilhelm Bockmann and Hermann
Ende, in 1886.
Bockmann arrived in Japan before Ende, and began sketching designs for the
government building complex- The first plan produced by Bockmann was called the ~'Project
for Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya" (KanchO Shi'tchu Keikaku).59 As Inoue had
hoped, this plan proposed the creation of an imperial capital that would impress foreigners
and aid the tre3ty revision process.60 The plan featured ~ central railway station in the middle
of a rail line linking the northern and southern city railway terminals and fronting a large
triangular plaza. Flanking the central station were two broad ceremonial avenues, named
Emperor Avenue and Empress Avenue, which converged in front of the station before
becoming Japan Avenue and leading to the proposed National Diet Building. When
pr~sentjng this plan to the government leaders in the Rokumeikan two months later in May,
Bockmann tried to persuade the leaders by making comparisons to similar plans for Vier..na
57 Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 11.
58 Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 11.
59 Bockmann's plan is reproduced in Fujimori, MeUi no Tokyo Keikaku, Appendix diagram
number 50.
60 Sorensen, The Making ofUrban Japan, 67.
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and Budapest,61 Bockmann recorded in his diary that the plan had been accepted with some
modifications, but the plan for the Diet building was well received.62 Bockmann then
traveled back to Germany in July of 1886 to finalize the plans, but only after meeting the
Emperor and receiving his thanks.63
Meanwhile, the Temporary Construction Bureau enlisted the services of another
German architect, James Hobrecht, the "father of Berlin.,,64 When Hobrecht arrived in Japan
in March 1887, he immediately advised that Bockmann's road plans be scaled back. Most
importantly, Hobrecht eliminated the proposed central railway station in Ginza, as it would
require excessive demolition of existing structures, although he kept plans for the north-south
railway connection.65 Ende arrived in Japan soon thereafter in May 1887 and also rejected
Bockmann's plan as being too expensive and requiring too much ofa change to the city.66
Ende and Hobrecht then both designed plans to group all of the ministry buildings into
square-shaped arrangements in Hibiya Park, surrounding a large plaza.67 Around this same
time in 1887, however, Inoue's treaty renegotiations failed, leading to calls for his dismissal.
Inoue finally resigned in September of 1887, also effectively ending the "Plan for
6] Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 19.
62 Horiuchi Masaaki, Meiji no Oyatoi Kenchikuka: Ende & Bekkuman (Tokyo: Inoue Shoin,
1989), 199; Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 19.
63 Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 19-21.
64 Fujimori, Meiji no Tokyo Keikaku, 238-239.
65 Fujimori, Meiji no Tokyo Keikaku, 239; Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshikeikaku, 47.
66 Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 22.
67 Ishida, Mikan no Tokyo, 23.
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Concentrating Government Offices in Hibiya.,,68 Only two buildings from Ende and
Backmann's plans were eventually constructed, the Tokyo Court Building, and the Justice
Bureau building.
On the same day that Inoue Kaoru resigned his post as Foreign Minister and chairman
of the Temporary Construction Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs (Naimusho)
Undersecretary Yoshikawa Akimasa stepped in to replace him as chairman of the bureau.69
Inoue's failure and resignation must have provided Yoshikawa with quite a feeling of
vindication. As governor of Tokyo in 1884, Yoshikawa had presented a revision ofthe failed
1880 Matsuda Tokyo Central District Demarcation proposal to Home Minister Yamagata
Aritomo. Yoshikawa's proposal, called the City Planning Statement, looked beyond the
central area of the city and outlined a modernization of the entire intra-city transportation
network by widening roads, digging canals, and most importantly, b1Jilding railways.7o Like
the Foreign Ministry plan, this Home Ministry plan had called for a railway connection
between the northern Nippon Railway terminus in Ueno and the southern Government
Railway terminus in Shimbashi. Whereas the Foreign Ministry placed the central station in
Ginza, however, the Home Ministry proposed a "central station" (chuo no teishajo) located in
the Kajibashi district.71
68 Ishizuka Hiromichi, Nihon Kindai Toshiron-Tokyo: 1868-1923 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigakku
Shuppankai, 1991), '10-11; Fujimori Terunobu, "Ende Bekkuman ni yoru Kanch6 ShUchU
Keikaku no Kenkyu: Sopo 3 Haikyoku he," Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Ronbun Hokokushu 273
(Nov., 1978): 141.
69 Fujimori, "Ende Bekkuman: Sona 3," 141.
70 The official name of Mayor Yoshikawa's proposal was Shiku-kaisei no Gi ni tsuketaru
Joshin, but is more commonly known as the Yoshikawa An.
71 Fujimori, Meiji no Tokyo Keikaku, 115. Kajibashi is the historic name for the area in
which Tokyo Station is currently located.
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In response to the Yoshikawa Plan, Homo Minister Yamagata established the Tokyo
City Improvement Committee (Shiku-kaisei Shinsakai) within the Home Ministry with
Yoshikawa as the chairman.72 The purpose of the committee was to investigate and enact
Yoshikawa's proposals, but Inoue was able to push through his opulent Hibiya plans,
shelving the Yoshikawa Plan for the time being?3 Only when the Foreign Ministry plan was
finally abandoned, was the Home Ministry able to reinstate its Yoshikawa plan. In early
1888, the Tokyo City Improvement Committee presented its Tokyo City Improvement
Ordinance (Tokyo Shiku-kaisei Jorei), based on the Yoshikawa Plan, to the Privy Council.
Because of the strong objection of Ito Hirobumi, the Privy Council rejected the bill in June
after three months of heated debate. Nevertheless, Home Minister Yamagata and Finance
Minister Matsukata Masayoshi ignored the decision ofthe Privy Council and passed the bill
in the Cabinet in August. The bill was then passed into law as an imperial edict that same
month.74
Although the Yoshikawa Plan was the brainchild of the Home Ministry, it was more
attuned to the creation of the monumental Teito than was the competing Foreign Ministry
plan. Certainly, Bockmann's magnificent Baroque-style design for the center of the city
would have made the capital an impressive display of power, but with the amount of
destruction and high costs necessary, the plans were never plausible. Perhaps the most salient
limitation of the subsequent alterations made by Hobrecht and Ende was the elimination of
the central railway station. Myopically focused on treaty revision, the Foreign Ministry had
72 Ishizuka, Nihon Kindai Toshiron, 44.
73 Sorensen, 67; Ishizuka and Ishida, "Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan and Its Urban
Development," 11.
74 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 67.
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lost sight of an important feature of grand capitals: that they display both domestic hegemony
and international power. With the removal of the central railway station, the Foreign
Ministry plan also lost its connection to Meiji domestic hegemony, integration through
railways.
For the Home Ministry, unlike the Foreign Ministry, domestic issues were of primary
importance. As it was their responsibility to maintain Meiji domestic hegemony, the Home
Ministry under'3tood the need to make Tokyo a political city worthy of being the imperial
capital.75 To ensure that Tokyo would display both domestic and international power, the
Yoshikawa Plan and the later Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance incorporated plans for a
monumental central railway station in the middle of a rail link connecting the northern and
southern raHway terminals. This connection made Tokyo the physical center of the national
railway network. As Fujimori Terunobu argues, "the one railway line laid from n0l1h to
south in the Y~shikawa plan was a connection between the networks of national territory and
cities.,,76 Only with this connection between domestic hegemony and international power
was Tokyo able to become Teito. Yet this was only possible because Meiji railpolitik had
fostered a national railway network that developed with Tokyo at the center. Without
railways, Teito was not possible.
75 Ishizuka, Nihon Kindai Toshiron, 45.
76 Fujimori Terunobu, Meiji no Tokyo Keikaku, 136.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GATEWAY TO THE IMPERIAL CAPITAL
When Tokyo Station bpened as the "Gateway to the Imperial Capital" (Teito no Genkan) on
December 18, 1914, it marked the completion ofa long process of re-creating Tokyo as Teito,
the grand national capital of Japan. Spanning two imperial reigns, Meiji and TaishO, the
process had started with the construction of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872, and escalated wIth
the Yoshikawa Plan and Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance in the late 1880s. The shift
from Tokyo to Teito was then accomplished with the creation of the monumental Tokyo
Station in 1914. Only a railway station codd combine ~he two elements necessary for
creating the imperial capital. Tokyo Station was the juncticm between the national raihvay
network that integrated the nation, and the center of plans to re-create Tokyo in the model of
the capitals of the West, complete with opulent Western architecture. In this way, Tokyo
Station was the manifestation of the domestic hegemony and international power of the
central government.
Tokyo Station displayed the authority of the central government in two ways. In its
. ,
practical role as the cornerstone of the Tokyo and national railway networks, Tokyo Stati0n
was the physical center ofI\-1eij i domestic railway imperialism. Symbolically, Tokyo Station
was the conceptual nexus of projects to unite the nation through ideology. As a railway
depot, Tokyo Station was a beacon of modernity and a representation of civ ilization and
enlightenment; and since it was also the personal station of the emperor, it served in addition
as the embodiment of the emperor system.
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Yet To~yo Station was more than just a mere rail depot. As the "Gateway to the
Imperial Capital," it was also the gateway to the empire. It was the measure by which the
city, and by extension the nation, would be judged on the international stage. Railway
stations with similar symbolic value were being constructed in imperial capitals around the
world, and it was only fitting that Japan should boast a grand Western-style central station in
Tokyo as a symbol ofits own empire. Tokyo Station as the "gateway to the empire" took on
an even more literal meaning as the Meiji government began enacting its own European-style
railway imperialism in Korea and Manchuria. With Tokyo Station sitting at the center of a
railway network that spanned the Japanese archipelago and connected Tokyo to the grand
capitals of Europe via rail ferry, Japan was able to claim its place as a first-class world power.
Constructing the Gateway
Plans for constructing the station that would eventually become Tokyo Station were initiated
by the German architects hired to design the Foreign Ministry's "Project of Concentrating
Government Offices in Hibiya," Hermann Ende and Wilhelm Bockmann. Although Ende
and Bockmann had provided the first plan for the "central station" (chua teishajo) in Tokyo,
calling for it to be placed in Ginza, the plans were rejected as too grandiose and prohibitively
expensive. 1 Nevertheless, the government saw the benefit of a symbolic central railway
station. Plans for such a station to replace Shimbashi Station as the "gateway to the capital"
were ultimately included in the 1884 Yoshikawa Plan and the 1888 Tokyo City Improvement
Ordinance? The next year, Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo ordered the Railway Bureau
I William H. Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority in Japan (London: Routledge, 1996),
231; Dallas Finn, Meiji Revlsited: The Sites of Victorian Japan (New York: Weatherhill,
1995),246-247.
2 Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 62.
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to begin a survey for the construction of both the station and the connector line? The
government then hired another German architect, Franz Baltzer, to draw up plans for the
elevated electric railway and the "central station" in 1898.4
Baltzer's plans situated the station directly opposite the imperial palace, an
arrangement that would be kept in the fmal plans for the station. However, this "vas the only
aspect of Baltzer's plans that would be adopted. Basing his designs on extant Edo-period
architecture, Baltzer designed a station that was, as William Coaldrake ::trgues, "entirely in
keeping with Japanese traditions of architecture and authority, but it was entirely out of step
with the intention of the Meiji imperial state to represent its new authority as a mcdern,
Westernise.d [SIC] nation."s
The government rejected Baltzer's plarls as not modern enough, or too Japanese, and
paradoxically sought a Japanese architect who could design a more suitably Western-style
building. In 1903, the government turned to Tatsuno Kingo, a leading proponent of Western
architecture in Japan.6 Tatsuno had designed the Western-style Bank of Japan in Osaka,
along with its branch offices. He also had experience designing Western-sty Ie railway
stations, as he had designed several, including one in Pusan, Korea and the important
Manseibashi Station in Tokyo. Tatsuno was therefore a natural choice for Tokyo's central
station, and unlike Baltzer, his plans were completely Western from the beginning. Tatsuno
also understood the symbolic importance of the station, and realized thaUt would be
compared the stations of the great capitals of Europe. "All of the great cities of Europe,"
----_. -----
3 Tokyo Minami Tetsud6 Kanrikyoku, ed. T6ky6-Eki Eki-shi, 25.
4 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority 231: Finn, Meiji Revisited, 247.
S Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 232.
6 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority 232-233; Finn, Meiji Revisited, 247.
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Tatsuno writes in the first line of a report on the construction of Tokyo Station, "even
London, even Berlin; they all have central stations.,,7
Construction of the station was delayed, though, by financial difficulties and two
wars, the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. But
victory over Russia in 1905 revitalized the project, and an even more "heroic" station
building was planned once construction resumed in 1907.8 The new and improved design of
the station owed to two key factors: the nationalization ofthe railways in 1906-1907 and the
presence of Goto Shimpei. The former offered incentive to enlarge the station, while the
latter inspired an increase in the station's imperial symbolism9
Serving at the time as cabinet member and Railway Agency President, GotO famously
urged the building of "a station that befits a Japan that defeated the great power Russia; one
that will shock the world."IO With this connection between Tokyo Station and imperial
identity in mind, in 1908, Goto ordered the plans for the station to be expanded from two
floors to three, more suitable for Japan's central station. 11 Perhaps also because of Goto's
influence in the cabinet, the budget for the construction of the station was increased, and the
chief engineer was sent to inspect major rail terminals in Europe and the United States. 12
7Tatsuno Kingo, "Chuo Teishajo no Kenchiku," in Kano Shobo, ed, T6ky6-Eki no Sekai
(Tokyo: Kano Shobo, 1987), 218.
8 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 248; Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 62.
9 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 234.
10 Tokyo Minami Tetsudo, T6ky6-Eki Eki-shi, 27.
II Oishi Manabu, Ekimei de Yomu Edo Tokyo (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2003), 24.
12 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 248.
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After nearly two decades of planning, Tokyo Station was finally opened on December
18,1914 to great fanfare and celebration in the square in front of the station. With the
enlargements ordered by Goto, Tokyo Station took on a symbolic importance suitable for the
center of the Teito, and a manifestation of the domestic hegemony and international power of
the central government.
Tokyo Station and Domestic Hegemony
The practical and symbolic roles of Tokyo Station were integral to the domestic hegemony of
the central government. In its practical roie, Tokyo Station served as the cornerstone of the
Tokyo and national railway networks. In this way, it was the physical center of efforts to
integrate the nation through the railways, a process that influenced even the naming ofthe
station. Secondly, in its symbolic role, Tokyo Station was the conceptual nexus of attempts
to unite the natIOn ideologically. As a rail depot and the personal railway station of the
emperor, Tokyo Station embodied both the emperor system and bunmei kaika.
From the inception of plans for Tokyo Station, it was recognized as the center of the
city railway network. Indeed, both the aborted Foreign Ministry "Project for Concentrating
Government Offices in Hibiya" and the Home Ministry's Yoshikawa Plan had called the
proposed replacement for Shimbashi station, which ultimately became Tokyo Station, the
"central station-." When it was opened in 1914, Tokyo Station replaced the previous Tokaido
Line Tokyo terminal statian of Shimbashi. From that time forward, the government described
Tokyo Station as the "converging point of all the State lines in the metropolis.,,13 A notice
from the Tokyo Railway Administration Bureau announced the beginning of passenger
service to Tokyo Station effective December 20, j 914. As the announcement made clear,
13 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 136.
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Tokyo Station was to be the main Tokyo terminns:-Theotdterminus-ofShimhashi :was-
concurrently renamed Shiodome, and was relegated to a freight-only station. The
announcement added that the station previously called Karasumori would thereafter be
renamed Shimbashi. 14 When the Yamanote loop was completed in 1925, Tokyo Station also
replaced the northern terminus ofUeno Station, allowing a through-connection on the
previou'ily separate Keihin (Coastal) and Tohoku (Northeastern) Lines. :More importantly,
the completion of the Yamanote loop marked the completion of one central railli::le that
extended from one end of the Japanese islands to the other, through Tokyo Station.
Although not completed untii 1925, the rail connection between the northern and
southern railway terminals, with Tokyo Station in the center, had been one of the earliest
planned railways in Tokyo. Plans for a link between the government railway terminus at
Shimbashi and the Nippon Railway terminus at Ueno were included in the Yoshn(awa Plan in
!884, and the proposal for a central station as fax back as 1886. These plans 'Nere made
official when the 1888 Tokyo City Improvement Ordinance called for the completio!l of an
elevated train lme between the two terminals. 15 Such a line was considered necessary as
increased traffic on the Tokaido and T6hoku Lmes began to overwhelm the capacity of the
Yamanote,16 Because the line would connect the terminals of both the government line and
the Nippon Railway Company, the line south from the proposed station would be built by the
government, with the line north to Ueno being built by Nippon Railway}? Accordingly, the
-----------
14 Announcement r~produced in Tokyo Minami Tetsudo, T6ky6-Eki Eki-shi, 35.
:5 Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 62.
16 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization if, Japan, 134.
17 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shashin-shi (Tokyo: Nihon
Kokuyu Tetsudo, 1972), 157.
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Railway Bureau began a survey the next year of its half of the line at the behest of the Home
Minister. In 1~93, Nippon Railways also conducted a survey for their portion. 18
After being delayed by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, a plan for the elevated
link between Shimbashi and Ueno was finally accepted by the National Diet in 1896. This
elevated line was proposed by Prussian engineer Herman RumshOttel, who had been hired by
Nippon Railways to conduct a survey on their half of the proposed north-south link through
Tokyo.19 As they had previously done for the new military and constitution, the Meiji
government looked to Europe for an example of urban railways when they set about
construction of this elevated line. The government examined London and Paris before
finding an ideal model in Berlin's Stadt und Ringbahn, or City and Circle Line, a system
where a loop encircling the city was bisected by another cross-town line. 20 The government
leaders resolved to construct a similar system in Tokyo, and fittingly hired the German
architect of the Berlin line, Franz Baltzer, in 1898, to draw up engineering plans and
supervise the construction of Tokyo's elevated line.21 Because the line would run through
existing business and commercial districts, it had to be elevated, requiring extra costS.22
Along with plans for a central station, Baltzer drew up designs for the elevated lines.
18 Tokyo Minami Tetsud6 Kanrikyoku, ed. Takya-Eki Eki-shi, 25.
19 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 231; Shima Hideo, ed. Takya-Eki Tarija: Oyatoi
Gaikokujin Barutsa- no Ronbun Hakken (Tokyo: Kajima Shuppan, 1990), 111.
20 Aoki, et. al. A History ofJapanese Railways, 81; Corinne Tiry, "Tokyo Yamanote Line -
Cityscape Mutations," Japan Railway & Transport Review (Sep 1997), 5.
21 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 231; Finn, Meiji Revisited, 247; Aoki, et. al. A
History ofJapanese Railways, 82. For a exhaustive study of Baltzer, complete with a
translation into Japanese of his original reports, see Shima, ed. Takya-Eki Tarija.
22 Aoki, et. al. A History ofJapanese Railways, 81.
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Although he was dismissed in 1903, his designs were used for the massive reinforced-brick
viaduct between Tokyo Station and Shimbashi?3
The purchase of land for the line, known as the Tokyo Elevated Railway, began in
1899, but proceeded slowly because of financial troubles.24 The Russo-Japanese War of
1904-1905 further delayed construction, and it was not until after the railway nationalization
in i 906-1907 that a new plan was established.25 The Tokyo Elevated extended northward
from Shimbashi intermittently as finances allowed. After several stops and starts in
construction, service to Karasumori began in 1909, then to Yurakuch6 in June 1910, and in
September of that year finally to the temporary station of Gofukubashi adjacent to the future
Tokyo Station?6
Meanwhile, the private railway companies in the Tokyo area, the Nippon Railway,
K6bu Railway, and S6bu Railway companies, had all been slowly advancing toward the
center of the city from four different directions.27 While the two earliest lines, the
Government and Nippon Railway lines, were able to build terminal stations near the core of
the city on the southern and northern sides, the two later railways were blocked by densely
populated areas or other complications. K6bu Railways, for example, had been forced to
23 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 247.
24 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in .lapan, 134.
:'5 Aoki, et. al. A History ofJapanese Railways, 81.
26 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway NalionalgatjQJl ifl.lapr:.m, U4.__ _
Karasumori is currently Shimbashi station. It was renamed concurrently with the opening of
Tokyo Station on December 18,1914.
27 Takeo Arisue and Eiichi Aoki, "The Development of Railway Network in the T6kyo
Region from the Viewpoint of the Metropolitan Growth," in The Association of Japanese
Geographers, ed. Japanese Czties: A Geographical Approach (Tokyo: The Association of
Japane"e Geographers, 1970), 191.
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build a terminal on the western outskirts ofthe city at Shinjuku, while Sobu was relegated to
the eastern periphery at Honjo.28 As railways became a more popular form of passenger
travel, the private railways, especially, sought to extend their lines closer to the center of the
city. More specifically, these extensions all targeted the proposed location of the new central
station.
Following the nationalization of the private railways into Government Railways in
1906-1907, the government set about completing the Tokyo city network. An integral part of
completing this envisioned network was also a line that would cut through the middle of the
loop, allowing a direct east-west connection across the city. The first step in achieving the
completion ofthe Yamanote loop and ofthe east-west link, was the nationalization of the
Kobu and Sobu Railway companies in 1906, and 1907, respectively.
As one of the most important railways in the Tokyo area, the Kobu Railway Company
was one of the first two lines nationalized by the government. The line was important for two
reasons: first, it extended to the west ofthe city, the direction of the city's rapid population
growth; and second, it cut across the middle of the Yamanote Loop directly to the area of the
proposed central station. Kobu Railways had begun extending their tracks steadily eastward
from their terminus at Shinjuku towards the proposed central station. The line was extended
to Ushigome by October 1894, to Iidamachi by April 1895, and then to Ochanomizu in
1904.29 Upon its purchase in 1906, the name of the line was changed to the ChUo Line, and
the government immediately began building a link to the planned central station. The
28 Arisue and Aoki, "The Development of Railway Network," 191. Honjo is currently
KinshichO.
29 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo Hyakunen Shashin-shi, 110; Chuo Shoin
Henbu, ed. Ekimei Jiten (Tokyo: Chl16 Shoin, 1995),29. Ushigome is currently lidabashi.
The name was changed November 15, 1928 (ChUo Shoin Henbu, ed. Ekimei Jiten, 29).
86
extended Chu6 Line was completed to Manseibashi Station in April 1912, with construction
on the next leg following the opening celebration of Tokyo Station in December 1914.3°
When the Yamanote loop was finally completed in 1925, Tokyo Station "literally
became the heart (chUshin) of the national network.,,3] Yet this was only the final act in a
long-practiced tradition of pladng Tokyo at the center of the national network. Tokyo had
long been the reference point for the network, as trains were referred ta, regardless of final
destination, as either going towards or away from Tokyo. Furthermore, Tokyo Station was
the "zero kilometer" point from where rail distances were measured for the nationallines.32
This tendency to put Tokyo at the center of the national network was solidified when 17 ,)f
the top private railway companies were nationalized in 1906-1907. From this point on, the
entire country, from Aomori in the northeast, all the way to KyushU in the southwest, was
literally connected by one line with Tokyo at the center.33 As prime Minister Okuma
Shigenobu proclaimed in his celebratory address for the opening of Tokyo station:
"'Furthermore, the heart (chUshin) of our country's railways, in other words. is nOthing other
than this station opening here today.,,34
Even the naming of the station was affected as part of the process of placing Tokyo
Station at the center of the national railway network. In fact, the opening celebration Jli
December 18, 1914 marked the first time that the station was officially called "Tokyo
30 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shashin-shi, 161.
31 H " ~ p •• ."r' "20ara, IVlzntO' tal 1 eno, .
32 Nakagawa, et. aI., Toky6-Eki Tanken, 28.
33 Hara, "Minto" tai "Teito ", 21.
34 Nakagawa, et. aI., Tdky6-Eki Tanken, 102.
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Station.,,35 Prior to this time, during planning and construction, the station had been called
the "central station" (chuo teish({io). Originally, this name was supposed to remain even
after the station was opened. While this nomenclature delineated the role that the proposed
station was to play in the Tokyo city network, it did not reflect Tokyo's position as the
v~, capital of the nation, and certainly not its role as the metropole of an entire empire.
Accordingly, the government, proposed to give the station a name with more symbolic
resonan~e.
Arguments made by Railway Agency Documentation Division Director Nakagawa
are representative of the government's proposal to change the name l)fthe station to Tokyo
Station. While people living inside Tokyo would easily understood "central station" as the
station located at the physical center of Tokyo, argued Nakagawa, people from outside the
city would not be able to make this distinction.36 The response from residents of Tokyo
stressed that designating one station "Tokyo Station" would isolate other stations in the city:
Within Tokyo there are many stations, such as Shimbashi, Veno, Shinagawa, and.
Shinjuku. l\Taming the central station "Tokyo Station" even with ali these 'Jther
stations, gives the impression that only Tokyo Station is in the city of Tokyo, and the
other stations, like Deno and Shimbashi, are somewhere in the countryside and not in _
Tokyo. So [the name] is not appropriate. The name should be "Central Station:' not
"Tokyo Station.,,37
Nakagawa's response to this argument reveals the government's emphasis on the role of
Tokyo Station as a symbol ofthe integrated nation. "The Central Station is the station at the
35 Harada, Nihon no Kokutetsu, 62··63. The St'ltiOl1 is referred to both as "Taka Teishaja and
Takya-eki."
36 Tokyo Hyakunen-shi HenshQ Iinkai. ed, Tokyo Hyakunen~shi 4 (Tokyo: Gy6sei, 1979),
735.
3'/ Tokyo Hyakunen-shi HenshQ linkai, ed. Tokyo Hyakunen-shi, 735.
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heart of Japan's railways," argued Nakagawa matter-of-factly, "Therefore, it must have a
name that is easily understood by people all over Japan. No matter what, making it Tokyo
Station is appropriate.,,38
Perhaps another reason that Nakagawa was so adamant in naming the new station
"Tokyo Station" is that it would serve a second purpose of reinforcing the domestic
hegemony of the central government by standardizing the name of the city. Ever since the
capital of the nation had been moved from Kyoto to Tokyo, and Edo renamed as Tokyo,
citizens of Tokyo were confused about the correct pronunciation of the new name of the city.
Based on the pronunciation of the characters used, it could have been either Tokyo or
Tokei.39 Ogi Shinzou points out that even in Taguchi Ukichi's 1885 treatise, Nihon Kaika no
Seishitsu, the characters for Tokyo were indicated as being pronounced "Tokei.,,40 The
characters for Tokyo were also occasionally drawn incorrectly. 41 Again, Ogi provides
examples of woodblock prints, even one print depicting the original Shimbashi Station, in
which the characters for Tokyo are drawn incorrectly.42 Lacking any official legal procedure
for changing the name of Edo to Tokyo, other than the imperial decree announcing the name
change, the usage of "Tokyo" to the present day has been merely customary.43
38 Tokyo Hyakunen-shi Henshu Iinkai, ed. Tokyo Hyakunen-shi, 736.
39 Jeffrey E. Hanes, "Contesting Centralization? Space, Time, and Hegemony in Meiji
Japan," in Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kern, eds. New Directions in the Study ofMeiji
Japan (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997), 489.
40 Ogi Shinzou, Tokei Jidai: Edo to Tokyo no Hazama de (Tokyo: Kodansha Gakujutsu
bunko, 2006), 31.
41 Oishi, Ekimei de Yomu Edo Tokyo, 26.
42 Ogi, Tokei Jidai, 33-34,41.
43 Oishi, Ekimei de Yomu Edo Tokyo, 26.
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The confusion in the pronunciation ofthe name of the city was a result of two factors:
first, the complicated decree announcing the renaming of Edo and the moving of the capital
to Tokyo; and second, the recalcitrance of the residents ofEdo. As Edward Seidensticker has
observed, "some scholars have argued that the name of the city was not changed at all. The
argument seems extreme, but the complexities of the language make it possible.,,44 Because
of the archaic language of the decree, Seidensticker explains, "this could mean that Edc is
still Edo, but that it is now also 'the eastern capital,' or, perhaps, 'the eastern metropolitan
center.",45 The decree was followed by the Emperor's visit to Tokyo, where he entered the
Shogun's castle on November 26, 1868, but it was not until the opening of Tokyo Station that
the name "Tokyo" had a tangible, geographicallocation.46
The tendency of Tokyo residents to mispronounce Tokyo as "Tokei" was not only a
result of confusion about the name of the city, but also of contentment for the Meiji
government and its far-reaching reforms.47 Until late in the Meiji period, many ofthe
residents of Tokyo had still identified themselves as "Edokko," or "children ofEdo." Many
of the Edokko had lived in the city from before the Meiji Restoration, and did not react
enthusiastically to the new programs of the Meiji government. Although they were not
completely pro-Tokugawa, they were more opposed to the new Meiji leaders, who they saw
as uncouth "country-bumpkin" samurai from the western provinces who spoke a rough-
44 Edward Seidensticker, Low City, High City-Tokyo From Edo to the Earthquake: how the
shogun's ancient capital became a great modern city, 1867-1923 (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1983), 26.
45 Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 26.
46 Keene, Emperor ofJapan, 163.
47 Hanes, "Contesting Centralization?," 489; Ogi Shinzou, T6kei Shomin Seikatsu-Shi Kenkyll
(Tokyo: Nihon Hos6 Shuppan Ky6kai, 1979),21-23.
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language.48 Demonstrating the opposition ofEdokko towards the government's reforms, Ogi
Shinzou relates a joke that was popular at the time, which makes use of a pun derived from
the multiple meanings and readings of Japanese characters. "Those bums from Kyoto
(Kamigata Zeiroku-domo) came and made Edo into this 'Tokyo, '" begins the joke, "From
above, they talk about things like 'Enlightened Rule' (Meiji), but from below, we read it as
'ungoverned by anybody' (osamaru mei).,,49
Naming the new station Tokyo Station thus reminded residents ofthe regime change
from the Shogun to the central government. The strategic location of Tokyo Station, and its
association as "The Emperor's Station," was an attempt to counteract this tendency to resist,
and compel the Edokko to recognize the regime change. As Matsuyama Iwao articulates,
"There was nothing more suitable to teach the Shogun-sympathetic (Sh6gun-biiki) Edokko
that the Shogun'S city of 'Edo' had become the emperor's city of 'Tokyo' than constructing a
large central train station in front of the imperial palace.,,50
At the same time, in its symbolical role, Tokyo Station displayed the domestic
hegemony of the central government as the conceptual nexus of efforts to use the emperor
system and civilization and enlightenment to unite the nation. The combination of emperor
and enlightenment was possible because Tokyo Station served as the emperor's personal
station. It was from this station that he embarked on state visits, accentuating the station's
role as the center of nation and state.51 The grand central entrance to the station was reserved
48 Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 28; M. William Steele, Alternative Narratives in
Modern Japanese HislOry (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 61.
49 Ogi, T6kei Shomin Seikatsu-Shi Kenkyu, 22; Steele, Alternative Narratives in Modern
Japanese History, 80.
50 Nakagawa, et. aI., T6ky6-Eki Tanken, 98.
51 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 225.
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for the imperial family, and the gate through which they passed to enter the station was
adorned with a rising sun, symbolic of the emperor's descent from the sun goddess.52
Befitting the imperial family, the central entrance rotunda was decorated exquisitely with a
marble floor, stained glass ceilings, and murals on the walls. At the heart of the station were
individual reception rooms for the members of the imperial family, each also lavishly
decorated with parquet floors, hinoki cypress paneling, and Nishijin silk hangings. The Plum
Room on the right was for the crown prince, while the Bamboo Room on the left was for the
lesser royals, and the Pine Room in the back was for the emperor.53
The design and architecture of the station, which "paid unequivocal homage to the
authority of the imperial institution," emphasized its role as a symbol of the emperor
system.54 One example of this unequivocal homage to the imperial institution i~ the station's
orientation: it was sited directly opposite the imperial palace. Another more striking
example was the extent to which efforts to place the emperor above the common people went.
Besides being far more ornately decorated than the commoner rooms, the central entrance
and special rooms reserved for the imperial family, were actually raised 3.5 feet. 55
The way the emperor was both symbolically and physically placed above the
commoners in the design and architecture of Tokyo Station even led to criticism ofthe station
52 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan: Ten Years
Progress Under State Management, 1907-1908 to 1916-1917 (Tokyo: Tsukiji Type Foundry,
1917), 136-137; Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 225. The central entrance and
private rooms are today still only used by the emperor and state dignitaries, although the
decorations were.destroyed by fire in World War II. Pictures of both the current private
rooms, and the "rising-sun gate" can be found in Nakagawa Ichiro, et aI., T6kyr5-Eki Tanken,
16. This gate can still be seen at the station.
53 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 248-249.
54 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 225.
55 Finn, MeUi Revisited, 248.
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as a whole. As Tamura Akira points out, referring to the way the station "revered authorities
and denigrated the people," (kanson minpi): "There was a major pwblem with this station.
The kl1nson minpi ideology of the time is clearly denoted in the station building. The station
tenaciously (akumademo) faces the Imperial Palace, and there were entrances open only on
the Marunouchi side.,,56 Indeed, as the station faced the imperial palace to the west, it turned
its back on the traditionally merchant-class "Low City" to the east. It was not until fifteen
years later that a tiny, isolated entrance to the station was opened "apologetically" on this
backside.57
The grandiose scale of the station arso received widespread criticism, even before
construction was completed. The most vehement denunciations came from the young
architect Enda Arata, who would later collaborate with Frank Lloyd Wright on the new
Imperial Hotel. Enda wrote a series of newspaper articles in 1915 deploring everything about
the station. Its location was too far from the heart of Tokyo. The station's design, he said,
'Jvas too long and its domes were too high, and the station's exaggerated dimensions made
people uncomfortable.58 On~ more criticism Enda had of the design of the building 'Nas that
the "north and south pavili.ons were out of proportion to the imperial center."S9 Enda was
referring to Tokyo Station's characteristic form: a central building flanked by two identical
56 Tamura Akira, Edo Tokyo Machizukuri Monojatari: Teisei, Hendo, Yugami, TenbO 2nd
Edition (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1st ed. 1992, 2n Ed. 1994), 242.
57 Tamura Edo Tokyo Machizukuri Monogatari, 242-243. It was not umil after World War n,
when the moat running behind the station was filled in, that a larger entrance· was put in on
the eastern (Yaesu) side of the station. lronically, the Yaesu entrances now receive more
traffic than do the original Marunouchi entrances.
58 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 249.
59 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 249.
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buildings larger and taller than the center,6D To Endo, having the imperial entrance less
splendid than those for commoners was tantamount to lese majeste. Some newspapers at the
time agreed. Referring to the height and width of these rotundas, they wrote that the rotundas
were "almost palace-like" (sanagara kyi1den no gotoshi).61 Certainly, the baroque-style
entrance used by the emperor was far lower than the rotundas on either side used by
commoners.
Tatsuno also apparently wavered on this unusual feature of the station. While
incorporated in the first generation of his plans for the station, the low center of the station
disappeared in the second.62 The central section of the station was enlarged in the second
generation, evidently in an attempt to emphasize, and suit, its role as the imperial entrance.63
In a design that Endo might have approved of, the central section was given an arched
pediment that towered over the two flanking buildings.64 This gave the station a form
familiar to many Western-style buildings signifying central authority, where the center
symbolically dominated the periphery. The central tower looked more like a lighthouse or an
60 Tatsuno's early sketches of the station plans are reproduced in Coaldrake, Architecture and
Authority, 234; Fujimori Terunobu, "Tokyo-Eki Tanjo," in Kana Shobo, ed, T6ky6-Eki no
Sekai (Tokyo: Kana Shobo, 1987), 54.
61 Nakagawa, et. aI., T6ky6-Eki Tanken, 101.
62 There is some disagreement between scholars on the order of Tatsuno's designs ofthe
station. Fujimori Terunobu wrote in 1987 that what is called the second generation of plans
here was actually the first (Fujimori "Tokyo-Eki Tanjo," 55). Fujimori is widely known as
the preeminent scholar on Tokyo city planning, but later works disagree, such as Yoshikawa
Seiichi and Mizuno Shintaro, ed. T6ky6-Eki to Tatsuno Kingo: ekisha no naritachi to T6ky6-
Eki no dekiru made (Tokyo: Higashi Nihon Ryokaku Tetsudo, 1990), William Coaldrake,
Architecture and Authority in Japan, 1996, and Azuma Hideki, T6ky6-Eki no Kenchikuka:
Tatsuno Kingo Den (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002).
63 Fujimori Terunobu, "Tokyo-Eki Tanjo," 55.
64 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 234.
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observatory than a train station entrance, and some within the government were concerned
that such a high tower would "look down" on the imperial palace. Hence, the third design
plan returned to the unique form the station would ultimately take.65
While unusual, the design of the station in its original form was symbolically
significant.66 Although End6 found the design almost treasonous, it seems that he was
missing the point completely. Due to the characteristic fonn of the center section of the
station being lower than the peripheral rotundas, the station almost appeared to be stooping.
In the ultimate showcase of deference to the emperor, it was as if the station was not only
facing the imperial palace, but also physically bowing to it.
This function of Tokyo Station as the emperor's personal station combined two
symbols of "civilization" in Meiji Japan. As Carol Gluck explains in Japan's' Modern Myths:
Ideolog;.' in the Late Meiji Period, "two ubiquitous images gradually emerged as symbols of
'civilization': the monarch, and the 10comotive.,,67 By combining the emperor and the
railway -- it was the emperor's personal station, after all- Tokyo Station was cast as the
epitome of "civilization and enlightenment" (bunmei kaika). Just as the Meiji Emperor had
been re-dressed in the new robes of modernity as an ideological symbol for the nation, Tokyo
Station was also constructed as a symbol ofmodernity: simultaneously as a grand Western-
style building and as a railway depot.
65 Azuma, T6ky6-Eki no Kenchikuka, 372.
66 Original, here, is referring to the design of the station before American firebombing
destroyed it on the night of May 25, 1945. Fires burned out the roofs, the domes, the third
story, and the opulent interior decorations. Because of a lack of funds after the war, the third
stary was never repaired, and clumsy planar roofs were placed over the three pavilions (Finn,
Meiji Revisited, 250).
67 Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985), 101.
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In Me(ji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan, Dallas Finn argues that Western-
style buildings, such as schools, police stations, clinics, and town halls, were "shining
beacons of another government objective, bunmei kaika, or civilization and enlightenment,
the catch phrase for westernization.,,68 Certainly, the same can be said of railway stations.
Built in the Western-style typical of Meij i-era construction projects, Tokyo Station was a
vivid portrayal of bunmei kaika. The station was a mixture of Japanese and Western
materials and designs: the steel infrastructure was imported from the United States and Great
Britain, while the bricks and decorative favade tiles were produced domestically.69
Moreover, the Japanese archiiect, Tatsuno Kingo, designed the station in the Western
"Renaissance Style" with arches, domed turrets, and circular towers.70
As with the earlier Ginza Bricktown, the government hoped that Western-style
buildings, as beacons of modernity, would literally enlighten the people of Japan and make
them "civilized." The celebratory address given by Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu during
the opening ceremony of the station reflected this expectation. Using the luminous rhetoric of
the time, Okuma described the station as the sun, noting, "its rays would brighten every side
of Japanese life.,,7! "Just as the sun at the center emits rays in all directions," Okuma
proclaimed, "we must extend the traffic network in all directions as if railroads were also
68 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 24.
69 Tokyo Minami Tetsudo, T6ky6-Eki Eki-shi, 27; Oishi, Ekimei de Yomu, 25.
70 Tokyo Minami Tetsudo, T6ky6-Eki Eki-shi, 27; 70 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 248.
71 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 249.
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beams of light." 72 Okuma then declared that Tokyo Station "represented shakai bunmei --
civilized life, itself.,,73
The second way in which Tokyo Station symbolized bunmei kaika was in its practical
function as a rail depot. As the central point of both the Tokyo city and imperial railway
networks, Tokyo Station was the product ofMeiji railpolitik. From the outset of railway
development in Japan, the Meiji leaders had seen the potential of railways, not only for
industrial advancement, but also for facilitating bunmei kaika. For this reason, the earliest
government routes had been planned to pass through areas highest in population, in order to
promote "civilization and enlightenment.,,7d
In describing the ideological impact of railways in the Meiji period, Carol Gluck
writes that they were "engines of civilization.,,75 Moreover, the locomotive had become a
"symbo! of 'civilization'" along with the emperor76 Railways were a symbol forthe two
focal points of government authority: "civilization" and "progress."n One way that railways
accelerated bunmei kaika was by forcing people to adopt a "clock time" standard ofprogre~s.
In 1888, the Meiji gov~rnment had placed Japan on world time, "coordinating railroads and
telegraphic services nine hours ahead ofGreenwich.,,7~ As Jeffrey E. Hanes has argued,
clocks "standardized temporal measurement and, in the process, hegemonized temporal
72 Nakagawa, et. aI., T6ky6-Eki Tanken, 101-102.
73 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 249.
14 Harada, "Railroads, Ch. 2," 16.
75 Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, 261. '
76 Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, 101"
n Hara, "Minto" tai "Teito ", 23.
78 Hanes, "Contesting Centralization?," 490.
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experience,,79 For example, clock time was necessary tor industry to prosper, as employees
would "clock in" and "cleck out" on a nationally shared time schedule.8o Railways, which by
nature required precise time scheduling to run efficiently, compelled the people to understand
and adopt clock time while encouraging punctuality.8! For this reason, railways, along with
clocks, "were Meiji Japan's supreme icons of 'civilization and enlightenment.',,82
There are many examples ofthe popular association between Tokyo Station and
bunmei kaika in Taisho Period popular media. One 1918 lithograph by .Amijima Kamekich~,
entitled "Drawing of Tokyo Station" (Tokyo teishajo no Zu), clearly shows the perception of
Tokyo Station as a beacon of modernity surrounded by other symbols of progress. ~Iale and
female commuters stroll through the electric lamp-lit station-front plaza; the men clad In .
fancy western dress complete with top-hats, the women in a mixture of Japanese and western-
influenced kimono. A foreign-looking couple with a child examines the fascinating scene
with their Japanese hosts. Rickshaws and taxis line up in front of the station waiting for
patrons. Large clocks on the front of each rotunda display the time for all to see. Finally: a
dirigible balloon and two early-model biplanes soar in the sky above the station.83 This
particular print wa~ used as a postal stamp during the Taish6 Period, suggesting how
widespread such a perception of the station was at the time.
A similar scene is portrayed in several more prints: a 1917 lithograph entitled "Scene
in Front of Tokyo Station" (Tokyo Teishajo no Zenkei); a 1921 print entit~ed "The Grand
79 Hanes, "Contesting Centralization?," 490.
80 Hanes, "Contesting Centralization?," 490.
81 Harada Katsumasa, Nihon no Tetsudo (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1991),24.
82 Hanes, "Contesting Centralization?," 490-491.
83 The 1918 lithograph is located on the back leaf ofNakagawa, et. aI., Tokyo-Eki Tanken.
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Spectacle of Tokyo Station" (Tokyo-Eki no Seikan); and a 1938 print entitled "The
Magnificent Sight ofMarunouchi Tokyo Station in the Imperial Capital" (Teito Marunouchi
Tokyo-Eki no lkan).84 All three prints show Tokyo Station amidst a scene of modern
symbols. Again, the station-front plaza is crowded with western-dressed people and street-
trolleys, and is illuminated by electric lamps. As if pulling the station along, a locomotive
exits the station on the far left of the 1917 print, with electric street-trolleys running below.
The 1921 print has a monoplane flying above the station, while the 1917 and 1938 prints
have airplanes and dirigible balloons.
Also conspicuous in these prints is the increasing presence of military personnel and
signs of militarism. The earliest print, from 1917, depicted no Japanese flags and only a few
soldiers and policemen. The 1918 print also only portrays a small number of policemen and
soldiers. In contrast, Japanese hinomaru flags top the rotundas in the 1921 print, and the
1938 print is overflowing with military symbols. Published the year after the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident led to all-out war with China, this latter print adds to the flags on top of the
rotundas with more hinomaru flags and Imperial Japanese Navy flags over all ofthe station
entrances. Even the street-trolley in front of the station, and the dirigible balloon and
biplanes flying above the station, has hinomaru flags waving proudly in the wind. The
figures of army and navy men have also replaced civilians in the station-front square.
As these lithographs depict, Tokyo Station was commonly portrayed in the context of
modernity. The presence of imperial soldiers and symbols of emperor-centered militarism on
and around the station in the lithographs reflect the dual identity of the station as a symbol of
84 All three lithographs are reproduced in Hayashi Junshin, Tokyo Shiden Meisho Zue: So
Tennenshoku Ishibanga Ehagaki ni Miru Meiji TaishO ShOwa no Tokyo (Tokyo: JTB
Shuppan Jigy6kyoku, 2000), 102-103, 104, 105. The artist of all three prints is not clearly
identified, but similarities with the 1917 print suggest that they might be the work of Amij ima
Kamekichi.
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progress and of the emperor. It was through this combination of the railways, the physical
link between the center and the periphery, and the basis for ideological unification ofthe
people, bunmei kaika and the emperor, that Tokyo Station became the manifestation of the
domestic hegemony of the central government.
Tokyo Station and International Recognition
As the monumental central railway station situated in the grand capital of a modem nation,
Tokyo Station proudly displayed to the great powers of the Western world Japan's
expectation of international recognition. Throughout Europe and the United States in the age
of imperialism, similar monumental central railway stations "became an opportunity for
propaganda in fierce international competition.,,85 Railway stations had assumed the role of
the triumphal arch gateway to display the city's magnificence.86 Stations such as Victoria
Terminal in Bombay, Berlin Station, Amsterdam Central, and the Gare De'est in Paris were
the symbols oftheir respective cities. Tokyo Station was built, then, "in the international
context of railway and capital-city stations as the expression of national confidence and
authority.,,87 Indeed, the construction of the station was on the same grand scale as London's
St. Pancras Station and Washington D.C.'s Union Station, and coincided with Union Station
and Grand Central Station in New York City.88 The grandeur of Tokyo Station was therefore
an attempt to place Tokyo on par with the great capitals of the West.
85 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority. 227-229.
86 E11in, Symbolic Space, 3-4.
87 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 225.
8B Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 224.
100
As central railway stations situated in the grand capitals of the world were commonly
used to demonstrate international and imperialist power, it was no coincidence that a
celebration of Japan's empire would coincide with the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station.
As William H. Coaldrake suggests in Architecture andAuthority in Japan, Tokyo Station
was "a temple to progress and a monument to empire.,,89 "The main building, with its grand
scale and warm red-brick walls held together securely by steel framing," writes Coaldrake,
"became the visible and functioning focus of a growing empire of communication, capitalism
and colonialism.... ,,90 Certainly, by the time Tokyo Station opened, Japan's rail empire had
grown along with its military expansion into Korea and Manchuria. Tokyo Station thus came
to possess a spot at the heart of the Great Japanese Empire (Dai-Nippon Teikoku), connected
to the grand capitals of Western Europe by railways and rail ferry.
Perhaps most indicative of the link between railways and the re-creation ofTokyo as
Teito was the doubling of the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station as a celebration of the
Japanese empire. The connection between the opening of the station and the expansion of the
empire was clear. On the suggestion of Tokyo Mayor Sakatani, the opening celebration had
been moved forward several months to coincide with the return to Tokyo of Gen. Kamio, the
commander of the Japanese force occupying the German possessions in China, causing
workers to hurry construction.91 Railway officials wondered if the new electric trains, which
89 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 223.
90 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 223.
91 The opening celebration of the station was originally planned for June 1914. A newspaper
article from the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi Shimbun, dated June 13, 1913, states: "Construction of
the central stations is progressing exceedingly, the exterior of course, but the construction of
the interior as well, is already 70% completed, and the station will most likely be open for
business as planned by June of next year. .." ("T6ky6-Eki secchi de Nihombashi-ku no chika
ga gobai ni," in Taisho Nyu-su Jiten Hensan Iinkai, ed. Taish6 Nyu-su Jiten 1: TaishO I-nen
- Taisho 3-nen, (Tokyo: Mainichi Comyunike-shonzu Shuppan, 1986), 560.
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had hardly been tested, would even run; or ifthe train tickets, which had not even been
printed yet, would arrive before the station opened. Because the decisirl11 was made to hold
the opening ceremony and the "welcoming of the triumphant general" (gaisen kangei kai)
concurrently, the plans for the celebration became all the more grandiose. 92
Preparations continued up until the day before the ceremony. The station platfoffils
were draped in red and blue lace braids, and flags of all the nations of the world, except
Germany and Austrialia, hung from the ceiling. A "Great Green Arch" was erected in the
station front plaza, with two 36-foot tall "Green Towers" on either side. More towers lined
the avenue between the station and the imperial paiace. Tremendous light towers were
constructed to illuminate the station until the early hours ofthe morning. Finally, the
Railway Agency had sent out 2,345 special invitations to the ceremony.
The account ofthe opening ceremony given the next day in the Tokyo Asahi
Newspaper reveals the connection between Tokyo Station and the expanding Japanese
empire:
The grand spectacle ofthe opening, the brilliance of a triumphant return! On this day,
the eighteenth [of December, 1914] Commanding Officer Kamio and his general
staff, were joyously welcome back to the Imperial Capital after their grand and
triumphant military expedition, and marked the first step in the opening for business
of the grand Tokyo Station, the largest station in Asia.9
With the renaming of the station to Tokyo Station, and with the relation of the opening of the
station to the expansion of the Japanese empire, Tokyo Station opened "with an appearance
92 Nakagawa, et. aI., T6ky6-Eki Tanken, 96.
93 Uchikawa Yoshimi, Matsushima Eiichi, TaisM Nyu-su Jiten I (Tokyo: Mainichi
Komyunike-sh,)nzu, 1989), 563, tra1l31ated in Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority. 230.
t ;
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appropriate for the central station of the capital of a 'first class power' Citto koku}:,94 Indeed,
the two "Green Towers" each had inscriptions that clearly depicted the station's role as a
symbol of the empire. "Celebrate the opening of the Station," read one inscription, while the
other proclaimed, "Welcome the Triumphant General.,,95
The final piece in the puzzle of re-creating Tokyo as Teito was the placement of
Tokyo Station at the center of the imperial railway network. For Japan to claim a place
among the exclusive group of first-class world powers, it too had to embark on European
style railway imperialism. The Meiji government had integrated and united Japan using
domestic railway imperialism, and upon completion of that process, was able to look cutside
its borders to create its own formal and informal empire. By the time Tokyo Station opened,
railway lines extended in excess of Japan-proper to the limits ofthe Japanese empire and
beyond as a result ofthis new railway imperialism.
A Japanese Government railway report from 1917 explains that ~he "overseas
expansion of Japanese railways" was possible because of two factors: "the nationalization of
railways and the Continental expansion of the Empire after the successful campaign w,lth
Russia.,,96 It was Japan's victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 that
ensured its rail empire on the continent. As stipulated in Article Six. ofthe treaty, Russia
agreed to relinquish control of its Manchurian railway between Changchun and Port Arthm 97
94 .Harada, Nihon no Kokutet$li, 63.
95 The "Green Arches" a10ng with their inscriptions are pictured in Nakagawa, et. al., T6ky6-
Eki Tanken, 97.
96 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Jepan, 93.
97 The New York Times, "Text of the Treaty: Signed by the Emperor of Japan and Czar of
Russia" Page 6 (October 17, 1905). Accessed on April 20, 2008 at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract htmPres-9Q02EFD61431 E73 3A25754C 1A9669D9464
97D6CF&scp= I&sqo=text+of+the+treaty+emperor-rof+japan&st=p. .
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Immediately after the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty on September 5, 1905, which
ended the Russo-Japanese War, Japan asserted control over its new rail empire. Service
between Tokyo and Seoul making use of rail ferry between Shimonoseki and Pusan on the
government's Tokaido Line started just six days later on September 11, 1905.98 Japan also
quickly forced the "Manchuria Remedial Treaty" (ManshU Zengo J6yaku) on the Qing
Government in December of the same year. With this treaty, the Qing Government
recognized Japan's control of the Manchurian railway south of the city ofChangchun.99 In
1906, the South Manchurian Railway Company was created by Imperial Decree to operate
this railway, and it soon began constructing and buying line extensions. IOO Demonstrating the
importance of South Manchurian Railways to the imperial government, the first president of
the company, GotoShimpei, would later become the first director of the Railway Agency
(Tetsud6-ln) in 1908.101
Coinciding with the Railway Nationalization Bill of March 31, 1906 were two
additions to Government Railways that were essential in the forming of Japan's imperial
railway network. First, when the government nationalized the private lines, they also seized
control of the rail-ferry systems operated by the former private lines. Second, another bill
promulgated at the time of the Railway Nationalization Bill authorized the nationalization of
98 Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6 Hyakunen Shi 3, 91.
99 Ando Hikotaro, Mantetsu: Nihon Teikoku Shugi to ChUgoku (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo,
1965),37.
100 Malcolm W. Davis, "Railway Strategy in Manchuria," Foreign Affairs 24:4 (April, 1926):
499-502: 500; Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan,
93.
101 Aoki Eiichi, et. al. A History ofJapanese Railways: 1872-1999 (Tokyo: East Japan
Railway Culture Foundation, 2000), 41.
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Keifu Railways (Seoul-Pusan) in Korea. 102 Together, these two additions signified a
symbolic shift from Tokyo as the center of the natIOnal network, to Tokyo as the center of the
imperial network.
The nationalization of the private railways in 1906-1907 also effected the
nationalization ofeach line's rail-ferry services. These rail-ferries facilitated the extension of
Government Railways into Korea and the mainland of Asia. At the time of nationalization,
the Shimonoseki-Pusan Ferry had two ships, each making only one run daily.l03 By 1917,
however, the number of ferries running between Shimonoseki and Pusan had increased to 5,
with one cargo ferry also making the trip. Other ferries operated by Government Railways
also expanded services during this period, but none as dramatically as the Korea route. After
1910, when Korea was formally annexed into the Japanese empire, the numbers for
passengers carried, tons of cargo conveyed, and total number of yearly trips rose noticeably.
A good portion of this ferry conveyance presumably served military purposes, especially as
Korean resistance movements gained strength.104 Such an escalation in the Japanese military
presence in Korea would account for the sharp upsurge in the total number of ferry trips and
tons of cargo conveyed between 1910 and 1917. Ferry trips increased from 1,078 to 1,550
102 Toshiharu Watarai, Nationalization ofRailways in Japan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1915), 54; Nihon Kokuyu Tetsud6, Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo' Hyakunen Shz 3.
91. The name Keifu comes from a combination of the contemporary Japanese names for the
Korean cities of Seoul (Keij6). and Pusan (Fusan).
103 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 78.
104 An informative, but perhaps dated, account of contemporary Korean resistance
movements is F.A. McKenzie, Korea's Fightfor Freedom (New York: Fleming H, Revell
Company, 1920).
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during this period, while tons of cargo conveyed over the same period escalated from 62,534
to 318,365. 105
This rail-ferry between Shimonoseki and Pusan was especially important because
Keifu Railways had been nationalized in 1906. Japan had won control over Korea from
Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and the government had begun integrating the Korean
railways into Government Railways. With the extension of the Government Railways to the
empire, it was necessary for their like to have a more appropriately regal moniker. Hence,
from 1907, the government lines were called the "Imperial Government Railways.,,106
Imperial Government Railways was then placed under the newly formed cabinet-level
Railway Agency by Imperial Decree in 1908.107 Showing the importance of railways to the
government, the Railway Agency was under the direct purview ofthe Prime Minister. In
addition, the agency administered not only domestic railways, but also the government
railways in Korea, which by this time had grown to include the Keigi and Bazanho railways
in addition to the Keifu. The South Manchurian Railway also came under the control of the
new agency. 108
A rail map from 1917, published in English by the Japanese Government, entitled
"General Railway Map of Japan & Manchuria: Showing Lines Open and Under Construction
105 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 79.
106 Teikoku Tetsudo TaikanHensan kyoku, ed. "Daisanhen: Tetsudo Kokuyu Nijunen" in
Teikoku Tetsudo Taikan Hensan kyoku, ed. Teikoku Tetsud6 Taikan (Hara Shabo, 1984), 4.
The Japanese name for Imperial Government Railways is Teikoku Tetsud6.
107 Teikoku Tetsudo Taikan Hensan kyoku, ed. "Daisanhen: Tetsudo Kokuyu Nijunen," 5;
Aoki Eiichi, et. al. A History ojJapanese Railways: 1872-1999 (Tokyo: East Japan Railway
Culture Foundation, 2000), 41.
108 Eiichi Aoki, "Policy, Ch. 4" in Yamamoto Hirofumi, ed. Technological Innovation and
the Development ojTransportation in Japan (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press,
1993), 73.
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on March 31, 1917," proudly displays this Imperial Government Railway network. The map
shows lines extending from Tokyo, across the Tsushima Straits to Korea, and connecting to
the South Manchuria Railway. The map also shows Japanese government railways in Taiwan
and the Japanese-occupied half of Karafuto (Sakhalin).109
One telling feature of the cartography of this government-issued railway map is that
the ferry line to Korea, between Shimonoseki and the Korean city of Pusan, is rendered
differently from the other ferry routes. The Shimonoseki-Pusan Ferry route is drawn with the
same style line as are other Government Railways, only dotted to denote that it is a ferry;
other ferry routes are indicated with thin dotted lines. This deliberate distinction in
cartography signifies the publisher's - that is, the Japanese Government's - perception ofthe
relationship between the Japanese mamland and Korea. After its annexation. Korea was seen
as an integral part of the Japanese Empire. Indeed, this map Romanizes the name ofthe area
as "Chosen," the Japanese pronunciation of the historical name of Korea, '·Chosun." II G
Additionally, by far the majority of Korean cities are Romanized not with their Korean
pronunciation, but with their Japanese readings. Seoul is marked on the map in English as
IC9 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, map in rear
packet.
110 The name "Chosun" dates back to the Yi Kingdom established in 1392. Accerted as a
vassal state of the Ming Empire in China, the Yi Kingdom was given the name "Chosun,"
meaning "Eastern Kingdom" by the Chinese Ming emperor. The name lasted until the late
1890s when the Russians encouraged the King ofKorea to change his title to the Emperor of
Taehan, or "Great Korea," in 1897. The Taehan Empire lasted until 1910 when Japan
restored them name of "Chosun," or "Chosen" in Japanese, even though pro-Japanese Korean
officials argued that "Hanguk" should be the name of the country. See, Bong-youn Choy,
Korea: A History (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1971),88.98, 104; and
Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895-,]919 (New York: Columbia University Press,
2002), 74.
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"Keij6," with "Seoul" added in parenthe<;es -ror readers already familiar with the Korear:
capita1.1 i I
Conceptually, the distinctive link between Japan and Korea on the map reflects the
idea of a continual, singular line connecting the entire Japanese Empire through Tokyo. The
Tokyo-Seoul route is a clear example of the continual line between the imperial capital and
the empire. While this overseas route was made possible by rail ferry, the Japanese
go\ernment made plans to actualize a singular, continual line between Tokyo and the empire.
At the height of the Japanese empire in 1938, the government initiated plans for what would
later become the Shinkansen, or Bullet Train. Included in these plans was a tunnei under the
Tsushima Straits to Korea, connecting Japan, Korea, and Manchuria into one grand imperial
network. lll Wh(;'ther by rail-ferry or by undersea tunnel, once the line of imrerial railways
was on the continent, Tokyo was no longer just connected to the empire. Rather, Tokyo was
ais::l linked to aa of the grand capitals of Western Europe, Such a connection, as the
government proclaimed, had "raised [Japanese railways] from an insignificant insular
position to one of international importance, as forming part of the main artery of the world's
communications.,,113
, Japan quickly realized the importance ofa connection to the grand capitals of El;Irope.
As a tirst step to reaching Western Europe, Japan had inserted rights to a rail link with Russia
an~ the Trans-Siberian Railway among the peace terms in the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905.
Article Eight of the treaty had prescribed: "The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia,
III Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, map in rear
packet. '
112 Mitsuhide Imashiro, "Dawn of Japanese National Railway," Japan Railway & Tran.sport
Review (January, 1997): 48.
1:3 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Rallway Nationalization in Japan, 93.
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with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will so soon as possible
conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in
Manchuria." I 14
Negotiations were held between May and June of 1907, producing the so-called 1907
Convention. This agreement between Japan and Russia specified that the Japanese South
Manchurian Railway Company and the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway
Company would share junction stations and rail gauges in order to facilitate through-traffic
between the two lines. I IS Following up on the Convention, a conference was held in
Petrograd in 1908, after which the first service for passengers was initiated between the South
Manchuria and Chinese Eastern Railway. 116 Subsequent conferences were held, gradually
initiating passenger traffic between Tokyo and Western Europe. In 1910, service was
arranged as far Russian-controlled North Manchuria, and in 1911, throughout Russia. An
agreement was made between Japan, Russia, and Great Britain and Canada for the
commencement of the "Around-the-World Tour via Siberia and Canada" at a conference in
London in 1911.117 Finally, at the Berlin Conference in 1912, Japan was admitted into the
Trans-Siberian Through Passenger Traffic Union, with service starting between Tokyo and
114 The New York Times, "Text of the Treaty: Signed by the Emperor of Japan and Czar of
Russia."
lIS United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United
States with The Annual Message o/the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1907
Vol. 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), 780-781.
116 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 94.
117 Harada Katsumasa, Mantetsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981),68; Imperial Government
Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 94-95.
109
the great capitals of Europe like London, Paris, and Berlin in 1913.118 The Japan Tourist
Bureau then began selling tickets to London the same year. I 19
As the 1917 government railway report states: "The conclusion of through traffic
service with Russia was but a preliminary step towards realizing the ultimate object which the
Railway Management had In view, and that was to bring Japan into direct rail ~ommunication
with London, Paris, Berlin, and all other leading cities in Western Europe.,,120 When Tokyo
Station was opened in 1914, connections to these other grand capitals of Western Europe,
after which Tokyo and the Japanese empire had been modeled, were already completed. The
government saw these connections to the West as not only links in communication, but as
indicators ofa long-awaited equality in modernity and power. In the minds of the
government leaders, Tokyo, as the Teito that displayed both the domestic hegemony and
international power of the central government, was on a par with the grand Western capitals.
Japan ~ould now declare itself a member of the elite group of first class world powei"s.
J 18 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan. 94.
119 Harada, Ma.'1tetsu, 68.
110 Imperial Government Railways of Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan, 94.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: TRACKS TO TEIKOKU
When the Meiji leaders overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate and came to power with the
Meiji Restoration in 1868, they initiated a project of state formation to make Japan a modern,
unified nation. An interesting comparison can be made concerning this process in Japan and
a similar exercise of modern state formation in Siam.
Starting in the 1870 and 1880s, Western imperialist countries had begun closing in on
Siam. Great Britain had annexed neighboring Burma in 1885, and French troops began
advancing from Vietnam in 1888 into the Siamese vassal states of Laos and Cambodia. In
order to prevent the conquest of his country, Siamese King Chulalongkorn undertook a
program of modernization. Foreign officers and advisers were brought in to Westernize the
military, install a telegraph network, and modernize the law code and government finances.
King Chulalongkorn also faced difficulties in integrating distant vassals and provincial
governors under central rule; sending troops rapidly over long distances to contest the
encroaching French; and implementing monetary tax collection in remote valleys. As David
F. Holm writes of these challenges, "Railways seemed an obvious answer to these
problems."l
The Meiji leaders confronted similar obstacles when they came to power in Japan two
decades earlier. The new government had inherited a land united militarily under the rule of
1 Holm, "Thailand's Railways and Informal Imperialism," 124. This discussion of railway
construction in Siam relies heavily on Holm's work.
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the Shoguns, but not politically or ideologically integrated into one nation. The mountainous
terrain of the Japanese islands, combined with Tokugawa-imposed regulations such as travel
permits and sekisho barriers, made inter-regional travel difficult. These obstacles to
nationwide transportation and communication contributed to regionalism, as people were
L unable to travel treely around the archipelago. The Meiji leaders attribute this regionaiism to
the inefficient transportation system, and saw it as a threat to their authority and a hurdle to
state formation. As Okuma Shigenobu explained, "Feudalism remains even after the
downfall of the Shogunate, and stands in the way of national unification ... ,,2 The Pro-
Tokugawa domains in the northeast also actively resisted the new government, further
threatening its legitimacy. Finally, on top of everything else, the new Meiji government had
to abide by the unequal treaties made by the Tokugawa with the Western powers. As Siam
would later do, the Meiji leaders looked to railways as one response to these complications
and as a means to form Japan into a modern, integrated nation.
Although leaders in both nations relied on railways to modernize and unite their
countries and secure domestic hegemony, they differed on how those railways shrmld be
built. In Siam, instead of building the lines themselves, King Chulalongkorn and the ruling
elite attempted to manipulate the imperial rivalries of the European countries to convince
these countries to construct the Siamese railways on their behalf. A German engineer, for
example, served as the Director-General of the mostly German-controlled Siamese Royal
Railways Department, and the construction contractor was British. An education system that
provided Western learning only to the scion8 of the aristocracy ensured that there were only a
small number of Siamese engineers. This increased the Royal Railway Department's
dependence on foreigners, and made it susceptible to intervention from the Imperial powers
2 Tanaka, "Meiji Government and the Introduction of Railways 2," 752.
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when foreign engineers were dismissed. To prevent an educated Siamese working class from
undermining their power, the ruling elite even repeatedly refused to send Siamese students
abroad to study engineering or establish an engineering school in Bangkok, despite pieas to
do so from the German directors of the Railway Department? In this way, rather than
depending on the dom~st;c modernization program to strengthen Siam 'lga;nst foreign
encroachment, the ruling elite instead "play[ed] one imperial power against another and
us[ed] ti)feigners to staffthe country's technical and professional positions.".1 Because the
royal family and ruling elite collaborated with, and depended heavily on; the imperial powers
to build railways and secure their authority within the country, Siam ultimately suhmitted to
"informal empire.,,5
The Meiji government, on th~ other hand, took.a much mort' unilqteral appwach to
railway building. Certainly Japan, too, had initially relied on foreigners sud: as British
ambassador ~arry Smith Parkes to heIr them build and operate the Shimbashi railway but
the Meiji leaders never relinquished control of railways to foreigners. Indeed, as it began
initial railway construction, the central government took out a loan on the London market to
finance the word, and the foreign advisors and engineers who guided construction were
dismissed once the government had fully exploited their expertise. The opening of the Osaka
Engineer Tminmg .School in 1877 hastened the dismissal of foreigners, an? qy 1~80,
Japanese engiTleers had largely replaced their foreign co,unterparts.6
3 Holm, "Thailand's Railways and Informal Imperialism," 127.
4 Holm, "Thailand's Railways and Informal Imperialism," 126.
5Holm, "Thailand's Railways and Informal Imperialism," 126-128.
6 Aoki Eiichi points out that the Meiji government hired nearly 300 mostly British foreign
advisors, or oy(11oi gaikokujin, in a variety of railway-related roles includi!1g teachers,
engineers, and other skilled workers. The first were hired in 1870 and the highest number of
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By undertaking railway construction unilaterally, the Meiji government was able to
limit foreign business ownership and influence in Japan. During the 19th century, railways
were the first tendrils of imperialism into target countries, and when the Siamese ruling elite
collaborated with the European imperialists to construct railways, Siam unwittingly
submitted to informal empire.? Because the Meiji leaders undertook railway construction
without relying on the Western powers, Japan avoided a similar fate. Unilateral construction
of railways was thus one way the Meiji government transformed Japan into a united, modem
nation-state.
Studies of state formation in Japan often focus on Meiji efforts to modernize the
nation politically and industrially, and to unify the Japanese people ideologically.
Replacement of the domains with prefectures, standardization of cadastral surveys, the
emperor system, "civilization and enlightenment," the education system, the Imperial
Constitution, and the establishment of the Japanese literary canon and historical tradition
have all been described as contributing to Japanese state formation. 8 Two related factors that
should not be overlooked, however, are the construction of railways and the re-creation of
Tokyo as Teito. To spread the authority of the central government, the Meiji leaders built
railways spanning the entire Japanese archipelago. Centralized on the metropole of Tokyo,
foreigners employed at anyone time was 119 in 1874. In 1880, the Osakayama tunnel was
constructed solely by Japanese builders. By this time, there were enough trained Japanese
engineers to replace foreigners in most occupations except for locomotive and bridge
construction, although they were replaced in these areas, too, in the 1890s (Aoki, "Dawn of
Japanese Railways," 2-3).
7 Faith, The World the Railways Made, 144; Holm, "Thailand's Railways and Informal
Imperialism," 126.
8 A good example of the wide range of factors in Japanese state formation can be found in
Umesao Tadao, et. aI., eds. Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVI: Nation-State and
Empire (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000).
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this national railway network facilitated industrialization and, with the assistance of the
private railway companies, conveyed the power of the Meiji government to even the smallest,
remotest Japanese villages. In this way, the railway network integrated Japan into a unified
nation centered on the national capital.
Railways also provided the infrastructure for ideological unification. With their
ability to carry passengers, ideas, and government officials and other "agents of the state"
quickly over long distances, railways shortened the temporal distance between the national
center and periphery.9 Locomotives, as modern industrial machines, symbolized progress;
and railways also embodied the emperor system, as they carried the Meiji emperor around the
country on imperial progressions (junk6). Gluck writes that "the monarch, and the
locomotive" became symbols of civilization and contributed to national and social
integration. 1O As the Imperial Train, or omeshi ressha, toured the nation, these two symbols
of civilization were physically conjoined as commoners lining the tracks showed their respect
to the emperor in the Imperial Carriage (Gory6sha).
Even when the central government allowed the formation of private railway
companies to complete its envisioned national network, the private lines inadvertently
contributed to Meiji railpoIitik. To ensure profits, private railway entrepreneurs built lines
that converged on Tokyo, as it was the largest city in eastern Japan and promised a large
market of consumption and supply of potential riders. In doing so, the private railway
companies reinforced the centralization of Tokyo in the national railway nenvork. The Meiji
government then maintained control over the network through legislation and by constructing
lines itself to ensure that the private railways would be compatible with the government
9Hobsbawrr.., Nations andNationali.'m, 80.
10 Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, 101.
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railway network. The Railway Construction Law of 1892, for example, prescribed standards
in line construction, such as line gauge, curve radii, and platform height, and gave the
government the right to decide where private railways were built. I I Finally, nearly fifteen
years later in 1906-1907, the 17 top performing private railway companies were nationalized,
and the government reasserted total control over almost 90% of the entire national railway
network.
As the national railway network developed with Tokyo at the center, the Meiji leaders
attempted to re-form the city into a suitable national capital that would demonstrate the
domestic authority and international power of the central government. Through a process of
domestic colonization, Tokyo became the measure by which the rest of the nation was
standardized, as Tokyo solar time was officially implemented nation-wide. As Nanette
Twine observes, Tokyo dialect also began to replace the Kyoto dialect as the means of
communication and as the "perceived standard language" after the relocation of the capital in
1868. The establishment of the national education system in 1872 further contributed to the
ascendancy of the Tokyo dialect. 12 Starting in the J.880s, when Tokyo was firmly implanted
as the national capital at the center of the national transportation and communication
networks, the Meiji leaders began to actively re-create Tokyo as Teito to project the
international power of the nation. Modeled on the grand capitals of the West and constructed
with Western-style architecture, Tokyo became an imperial capital suitably dressed in
symbols of civilization and progress.
This re-creation of Tokyo as Teito was envisioned most significantly in the planning
and construction of a central national railway station. Although not completed until 1914,
II Harada, "Policy, Ch. 3," 47; Kinzley, "Merging Lines," 43.
12 Twine, "Standardizing Written Japanese," 438-439.
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two years after the death of the Meiji Emperor, Tokyo Station was the apex of Meiji-era
Western-style architecture and of Japan's quest for domestic hegemony and international
recognition. It was the work of a major Meiji architect, Tatsuno Kingo, and its planning and
construction, which spanned two imperial reigns, took place largely during the Meiji period.13
1" j Tokyo Station, as the junction between the integrated national railway network and
monumental Tokyo city planning, projected the power and authority of the Meijl government.
Not only did the construction of the railway network centered on Tokyo Station facilitate the
transition from Tokyo to Teito, its railway tracks literally and figurativeiy led to Teito ..
With the expansion of Government Railways to Korea, whereby initiated its own
European style railway imperialism, Tokyo Station became the center of the imperial railway
network. Indeed, the opening ceremony for the station in 1914 fittingly dcubled as a
celebration and a confirmation ofthe Japanese empire. Ethnologist Umesao Tadao has
suggested that in Japan "the construction of a nation-state was indeed the building of an
empire.,,14 In other words, the formation of the Japanese nation-state and the emergence of
the Japanese empire were parallel events.15 Yamamuro Shin'ichi describes this as the
"duality" of the Meiji state, "namely, that it held colonial possessions while in the process of
becoming a nation-state and itself became a colonial empire.,,16 Umesao explains that this
13 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 246.
14 Umesao Tadao, "Keynote Address: Comparative Studies of Civilization with regard to the
Formation and Transformation ofthe ~ation-State,"in Umesao et. aI., eds.lv'ation-Stale and
Empire. 5.
15 Knrimoto Eisei writes that the transformation of the national army into an overseas army
"was parallel with the process of state building that resulted in moden' Japan; \\- hile the
Japanese were trying to build a nation-state, they began to construct an empire)" (Kurimoto
Eisei, "Nation-State, Empire, and Army: The Case of Meiji Japan," in Umesao, et. aI., eds.
Nation-State and Empire, 106).
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duality was a result of Japan mistakenly following the imperialist lead of the Western
countries on which it had modeled itself. "Japan faithfully observed the European mode! in
her process of nation building in modern times," Umesao argues, "thus pursuing the
construction of a Japanese empire."I?
One way that the Japanese govemment followea the leal:! of:he \Vest in creating an
empire was by f(·llowing Western models of railway imperialism. After successfully
integrating the notion, the Meij i leaders turned their attention towards Kl'~ea as a target of
Western-style railway imperialism. During the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese arnlY began
seeking ways to secure power in Korea, and resolved to construct railways. By 1894, the
Japane<;e had developed plans for the construction of four railways on theKoTeanpeninsu1a. 18
One line was eventually built by the United States, but this was later sold to Japan From that
tli!le, Japan controlled all milways in Korea A proposal for Korean raiivvay construction
submitted by Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro in 1902 to Prime Minister ~atsura Taro
elucidates the Meiji government's railway imperialism:
If Japae constructs the Gyeongui (Seoul-Pyongyan) Line on our own and connects to
the Gyeongbu (Seoul-Pusan) Line, all major railways will be in the hands of our
empire, in effect keeping Korea under our influence. 19
16 Yamamuro Shin'ichi, "The Evolving Meiji State: It's Dual Character as a Narivn-State and
Colonial Err.pire," in Umesao, et. aI., eds. Nation-State and Empire, 11.
i? Umesao, "Keynote Addrt-ss," 4.
18 Janet Hunter, "Japanese Government Policy, Business Opinion and the Seoul-Pusan
Railway, 1894-1906," Model~n A.\'ian Studies 11:4 (1977): 573.
19 Quoted in Nakano Akira, "Railway Network was Key to Japanese Army's Control of
Korea," The Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 28, 2007.
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As Foreign Minister Komura suggests, the Japanese government employed railways not only
to assert their domestic hegemony, but also to expand the empire. Thus railways were not
only instrumental in the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital, or Teito, but also the
formation of the empire, or teikoku. This connection between railways and the expansion of
the empire would have disastrous consequences as Japan's imperialistic ambitions brought it
into direct conflict with another nation increasing its influence in the Pacific, the United
States.
On May 25, 1945, towards the end of World War II, American B-29s dropped
incendiary bombs on the station, igniting the roof, the domes, the entire third story, and the
wooden interior.2o The elegant imperial rooms were razed, as were the opulent decorations in
the rest of the station. The imperial symbolism of the station had been demolished along with
the Japanese empire. As Tokyo Station was the center of the imperial network, perhaps this
destruction was sadly fitting. The station was rebuilt, but, due to financial constraints after the
war, the domes were replaced with unsightly planar "lids" of roughly equal height,21 The
melted steel supports were left to hang under the temporary rafters "like strings of melted
toffee," and the third story remained unfinished?2 Tiles were stripped off the backside to
replace those destroyed in the fire, and it was then painted a "strange, simian red.'.23
Yet this destruction and unimpressive reconstruction of the station did not completely
destroy Tokyo Station's potential to be a domestic and international symbol. After the war, it
remained the heart of both the national and Tokyo city railway networks. In 1964, as the
20 Oishi, Ekimei de Yomu Edo Tokyo, 25; Finn, Meiji Revisited, 250.
21 Finn, Afeiji Revisited, 250.
22 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 250.
23 Finn, Meiji Revisited, 250.
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Tokyo Olympics approached, the opening of the Bullet Train, or Shinkansen, confirmed the
central position of Tokyo Station in the national network. As the Shinkansen network was
later expanded to include lines northwest to Niigata in 1982 and Nagano in 1997, and
northeast to Acmori, Akita, and Yamagata starting in 1982, Tokyo Station remained the "zero
kilometer" point for the network. Not only do all Shinkansen trains either terminate or
originate at Tokyo Station, passengers traveling from northeast Japan to southwest Japan
must disembark and then switch trains at the station.
Surpassed for many years by other urban Tokyo rail hubs such as Shinjuku and Ueno,
Tokyo Station promises to benefit from a new rail plan designed to strengthen its place at the
center of the Tokyo city railway network. Called the "T6hoku Through-Line Plan" (T6hoku
Jakansen Keikaku)," this project proposes the construction of additional elevated tracks
between Tokyo Station and the northern terminus ofUeno Station. Japan Rail train lines that
originally terminated at Ueno, such as the Utsunomiya Line, Takasaki Line, and Jaban Line,
will be extended to Tokyo Station, initiating through service with the T6kaid6 Line.24 With
the completion of this plan in 2013, the majority of JR train lines within the 23 wards of
Tokyo will pass through Tokyo Station, buttressing its position at the center ofthe Tokyo city
'1 k 25ral way networ .
While Tokyo Station has retained and reinforced its functional importance as the
domestic hub of national rail travel, a new plan for the renovation of the station to its
opening-day appearance in 1914 will attempt to restore its international significs.nce.
24 JR Higashi Nihon Ryokyaku Tetsudc Kabushikigaisha, Utsunomiya, Takasaki, loban-Sen
no Tokyo-Eki nori-ire ni tsuite (Takaido-sen tu no sago chokutsu unten), March 27,2002.
25 By my C0unt of the March 15, 2008 train line designations, only four vof~thJ1;e~17J--.JcJR~l~in,Jl;e'lls~------------1
within the 23 'vvards of Tokyo city, the S6bu Local Line, the Saiky6 Line, the Tokyo
Monorail, and the ShOnan-Shinjuku Line, will not pass through Tokyo Station.
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According to plans for the restoration work, which started in March 2007, the third floor will
be reconstructed, and the north and south domes will be restored to their original condition.
Part of a larger project called "Tokyo Station City," which includes two new skyscrapers
flanking the station, the renovation is aimed at handing down the cultural legacy of the
building "to future generations" and represents an effort to "contribute to the development of
a stately urban space for Tokyo.,,26 As the gateway to the Marunouchi financial district,
where many of the world's largest companies have offices. the newly renovated Tokyo
Station will re-emerge as a befitting centerpiece for the global capital of an economic
superpower. With the "Tokyo Station City" plans, Tokyo Station is still the junction of the
national railway network and monumental city planning. Much as it did in the pre-World
War II years for the Japanese colonial empire, the newly renovated Tokyo Station will evoke
Japan's claim as a first class world economic power.
26 International Department of East Japan Railway Company, "Tokyo Station City" PTI
(Sept/Oct. 2007): 21.
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